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I. SUCCESSOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY ISSUES
A. Introduction
As recently as twenty years ago, a corporation purchasing the assets
of another corporation could be fairly certain that, if the purchase was
carefully done, it would not be liable for claims resulting from defective
products manufactured by the selling corporation. That, however, is no
longer the case. Any corporation considering an asset acquisition today
should carefully evaluate the risks of possible successor liability for
defective products manufactured by the selling corporation.
The first section of this Article will first review the development of
the law of successor liability for defective products, looking at both the
traditional rule of nonliability in asset acquisitions and the recently
developed exceptions which impose liability on the purchasing corpora-
tion. With that historical review as background, the Article will then
discuss a number of issues relating to the emerging law of successor
liability that should seriously concern anyone considering an asset
acquisition. Finally, the Article will offer some comments on structur-
ing asset acquisitions to protect the purchaser.
First, then, a brief review of the traditional rule and how the law in
this area has reached its present unsettled state.
B. Development of the Law of Successor Product Liability
1. THE TRADITIONAL RULE OF NONLIABILITY
The general rule of corporate successor liability has been-and in
fact continues to be-that where one company sells or otherwise trans-
fers all of its assets to another company, the acquiring company is not
liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling company, simply by vir-
tue of its succession to the ownership of the assets of the selling com-
pany.' This general rule of corporate nonliability has served, in effect,
as a security blanket protecting corporate successors from unknown or
contingent liabilities of their predecessors.2
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, the general rule of
corporate successor liability "was designed for the corporate contractual
world where it functions well. ' ' 3 While construing the law of the Virgin
1. See Conway v. White Trucks, 692 F. Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 90 (3d
Cir. 1989).
2. See Luxliner P.L. Export, Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1993); Conway
v. White Trucks, 692 F. Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1989).
3. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Islands, the court wrote that the traditional rule protects creditors and
dissenting shareholders, facilitates a determination of responsibility for
taxes, and promotes the free alienability of business assets.4 However,
the court also noted that courts will not exalt form over substance. 5 As a
result, courts may, under appropriate circumstances, decide that "the
new organization is simply the older one in another guise."6
Traditionally, courts have recognized only four exceptions to the
general rule of nonliability.
The first exception arises in situations where the purchaser either
explicitly or implicitly agrees to assume some or all of the debts and
liabilities of the seller.7 The application of this exception usually is
fairly straightforward. The purchasing corporation will normally
assume certain liabilities necessary to ensure the uninterrupted conduct
of the business. For example, purchasing corporations often expressly
assume selling corporations' contracts. They often avoid unwanted or
contingent liabilities, such as liability for defectively manufactured
products, through a clause in the sales contract that expressly denies
responsibility for all liabilities not expressly assumed in the contract.
When disputes arise regarding the assumption of liabilities, they typi-
cally involve the question of whether an unforeseen liability has been
impliedly assumed. For instance, in Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc.,8 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, under both Pennsylvania and
Illinois law, an asset-sale agreement, whereby the buyer assumed and
agreed "to pay, perform and discharge all debts, obligations, contracts
and liabilities" of the seller, included assumption of the seller's unfore-
seen liability for products liability claims.9 The court rejected the
buyer's argument that the assumption of liability provisions were ambig-
uous because they did not specifically mention products liability
claims."° The problems that arise, as a rule, could have been avoided by
careful drafting.
The second exception to the traditional rule of nonliability arises in
cases where the court finds that the transaction is really a consolidation
or merger of the seller and purchaser. 1 The theory of a de facto merger
developed in Pennsylvania as a way of providing dissenters' rights for
shareholders disgruntled by a corporate transaction that was structured
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. 875 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1989).
9. Id. at 154-55.
10. See id.
11. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986).
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to avoid statutory dissenters' rights. In the early 1970's, a few courts
began to apply the concept of a de facto merger in suits seeking to
impose liability for defective products on a successor corporation.
Courts have looked at a number of factors to determine whether a de
facto merger has occurred so as to justify imposing products liability on
a successor corporation. These include whether stock is part of the
purchase price for assets, whether there is continuity of business opera-
tions between the two companies, and whether the successor assumed its
predecessor's debts.' 2 There are, however, two threshold characteris-
tics-continuity of shareholders, meaning that the acquisition was made
with shares of the purchasing corporation, so that the shareholders of the
seller became shareholders of the purchaser, and prompt dissolution of
the selling corporation.
An important development that contributed to the movement away
from the traditional rule of non-liability is found in connection with the
de facto mergers exception in the case of Knapp v. North American
Rockwell Corp.3 In Knapp, the Third Circuit did two important
things-first, it disregarded the requirement that the selling corporation
dissolve after the asset transfer, and second, it analyzed the case in terms
of the policies underlying strict products liability.' 4 Thus, although the
selling corporation had not immediately dissolved after the transfer of
assets, the court observed that the plaintiff would be left without a rem-
edy, if the successor were not held liable.' 5 The court noted that, when
resolving issues relating to the recognition of a cause of action in favor
of an injured party, the Pennsylvania courts have emphasized the public
policy considerations served by imposing liability on the defendant,
rather than formal or technical requirements. 6 Although it recognized
that neither the predecessor nor the successor were in a position to avoid
the accident, the Third Circuit concluded that the successor was the
party better able to spread the burden of the loss.'7 Knapp is important
as a harbinger of recent developments in the area of successor liability.
However, the expanded exception for de facto mergers developed by the
Third Circuit has not been followed because it is limited to acquisitions
made with stock and because a court wishing to impose liability on a
successor today may do so more directly under the new theories dis-
cussed later in this Article.
It is important to note, however, that the de facto merger doctrine
12. See Luxliner P.L. Export, Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1993).
13. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
14. See id. at 369.
15. See id. at 368.
16. See id. at 369.
17. See id. at 369-70.
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has, in one case, been applied to a sale of assets where neither corpora-
tion's stock transferred.' 8 In Diaz v. South Bend Lathe Inc., although no
shares were exchanged, the court found a de facto merger had occurred
based on evidence of the dissolution of the predecessor corporation; the
assumption of liabilities by the successor; and the continuity of manage-
ment, personnel, and physical operation. 19 The conclusion that a succes-
sor corporation is a continuation of its predecessor when no stock is
exchanged, however, has more frequently occurred under the "continuity
of enterprise exception" which will be discussed later. Indeed, in
National Gypsum Co. v. Continental Brands Corp.,2" the district court
remarked thatwhile the Diaz court purported to find a de facto merger, it
actually relied upon the "continuity of enterprise" reasoning to reach its
result. 21 Thus, the Diaz decision is of questionable precedential value.
The third exception to the traditional rule of nonliability arises in
situations where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of
the selling corporation.22 This exception has traditionally hinged on
whether there is a continuity of ownership or corporate structure
between the selling corporation and the buying corporation. The pri-
mary elements of continuation include the buyer's use of the seller's
name, location, and employees and a common identity of stockholders
and directors. It is important to emphasize that historically this excep-
tion was applied only in very limited circumstances where the successor
corporation was materially identical to the predecessor. For instance,
one court has noted that the "test is not the continuation of the business
operation, but rather the continuation of the corporate entity. ' 23 How-
ever, a variation of this exception known as the "continuity of enter-
prise" doctrine is one aspect of the more liberal approach to successor
liability that will be addressed in this Article.
The fourth, and final, exception to the traditional rule of nonliabil-
ity arises where a transaction is entered into fraudulently to evade liabil-
ity for debts. 24 This exception, the fraud exception, has been used to
impose liability on a successor corporation where, for example, the con-
sideration given for the assets was fictitious or inadequate. Thus, to
impose liability on the successor corporation, the law requires a finding
that the corporate transfer of assets "is for the fraudulent purpose of
18. See Diaz v. South Bend Lathe Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
19. See id. at 100-02.
20. 895 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass. 1995).
21. See id. at 341 n.17.
22. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1986).
23. Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 542 (D. Del. 1988).
24. See Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 302
(1995).
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escaping liability."25 In essence, it is simply an application of the gen-
eral rule against fraudulent conveyances. In the products liability con-
text, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, applying
Oregon law, found that the fourth exception to the traditional rule of
nonliability applied where a successor corporation had been formed for
the purpose of avoiding liability for judgments entered against its prede-
cessor in asbestos litigation.26
The traditional rule of nonliability in the sale of assets, along with
the four exceptions just discussed, developed within the context of cor-
porate law and addressed the issue of liability for obligations and debts
that were primarily financial in nature. As suggested by the Knapp
case, 27 however, the development of the modem law of products liabil-
ity, with the application of strict liability in tort, has placed the tradi-
tional rule of nonliability in asset acquisitions under some conceptual
strain. The response of a number of courts to that perceived strain is a
major impetus for this Article.
As a quick aside, it is interesting to note the Third Circuit's discus-
sion of the policies underlying strict products liability in relation to suc-
cessor liability. In Polius, the court wrote that recent developments in
the area of successor liability rest in large part on the need to compen-
sate eligible plaintiffs. 28 The court concluded that "the better approach"
is to reject these recent developments. 29 According to the court, focus-
ing exclusively on the needs of products liability plaintiffs encourages
courts to overlook the business world's valid arguments. 30 "Unforeseen
alterations in successor liability principles complicate transfers and
increase transaction costs."' 3' According to the court, adhering to the
traditional rule, with its familiar exceptions, fosters "a climate of relative
certainty and reasonable predictability. '32 The court wrote that such a
climate is best for major economic decisions, which are "critical to
society. 33
As this Article will discuss later, a number of courts have recently
refused to extend the traditional principles of successor liability to com-
pensate plaintiffs. Instead, these courts have favored a return to the
traditional rule of nonliability with its recognized exceptions. The Arti-
25. Id.
26. See Schmoll v. AC and S, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988), aff'd, 977 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1992).
27. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
28. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1986).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 83.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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cle will now move to a brief discussion of the cases that have departed
from the traditional rule of nonliability.
2. MODERN RULES OF EXPANDED LIABILITY
a. The "Continuity of Enterprise" Exception
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,34 a 1976 case, the Michigan
Supreme Court imposed liability on a successor corporation in a situa-
tion where the traditional rule, even with the exceptions just described,
would not have imposed liability. The court's analysis essentially
expanded the third exception to the traditional rule of nonliability, that
is, mere continuation of the selling corporation. After observing that
there clearly would have been liability under the de facto merger excep-
tion if the acquisition had been made for stock rather than cash, the court
stated that it could find no reason to treat acquisitions for stock or cash
differently. In effect, the court held that the analysis in Knapp should
also apply to cash transactions. The court thus found that it would be
proper to impose liability on the purchasing corporation after evaluating
factors such as the successor's corporate entity's ownership, manage-
ment, personnel, physical location, assets, trade name, and general busi-
ness operation.36
Although the continuity of enterprise exception articulated in Tur-
ner has not received as much attention as the product line exception,
which will be considered next, it has been adopted in Alabama,37 and
has been favorably treated in Pennsylvania.38 However, the continuity
of enterprise exception has also received criticism. As already noted,
the Third Circuit criticized the exception in Polius.39 Moreover, nine
states have rejected the continuity of enterprise exception. 0 . In Niccum
v. Hydra Tool Corp., for example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
accepted the argument that the Turner exception should not be adopted
because the successor corporation did not create the risk by placing a
34. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
35. See id. at 883.
36. See id. at 883-84.
37. See Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 .So. 2d 827 (Ala. 1988); Andrews v. John E. Smith's
Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979).
38. Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. 1981).
39. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 1986).
40. See Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Nissen Corp.
v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989);
Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Schumacher v. Richards
Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d
118 (N.D. 1984); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986);
Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376
N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985).
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defective product into the market, did not represent to the public the
safety of its predecessor's product, and received profit on the product
only in a remote way.4
b. The "Product Line" Exception
In 1977, one year after the Turner decision, the California Supreme
Court first articulated what is referred to as the "product line excep-
tion."42 In Ray v. Alad Corp., the buyer purchased the physical plant,
manufacturing equipment, inventories of raw materials and finished
goods, trade name, goodwill, and records of manufacturing designs from
the seller.43 The buyer also continued the employment of the factory
personnel and hired the seller's general manager as a consultant."
Moreover, the buyer continued to manufacture the same product line
under the same name and held itself out to potential customers as the
same enterprise.45 The California Supreme Court concluded that "a
party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output
of its line of products under the circumstances here presented assumes
strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line previously
manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was
acquired. 46 Its justification for imposing strict liability was threefold:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the orig-
inal manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the busi-
ness, (2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's
risk-spreading role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to
assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden nec-
essarily attached to the original manufacturer's good will being
enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business.47
In the first few years following the Ray decision, a number of states
adopted the product line exception. New Jersey, for example, adopted
the product line exception in 1981 in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries,
Inc.48 After analyzing the differences between the continuity exception
formulated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Turner and the product
line exception in Ray, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that it
would be best to adopt the rule in Ray which focuses on continuation of
the manufacture of the product causing injury.4 9
41. See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99.
42. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
43. See id. at 5.
44. See id. at 5-6.
45. See id. at 5.
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id. at 9.
48. 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
49. See id. at 819.
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When the issue of successor liability was first presented to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, in Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel
Co.,5" the court referred to Turner, Ray, and Ramirez in deciding to
impose liability on the successor corporation.51 The court concluded
that it would be best not to phrase the product line exception "too
tightly" "so that in any particular case the court may consider where it is
just to impose liability on the successor corporation." 52 Thus, although
the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis in Ramirez focused on contin-
ued manufacture of the same product line causing the injury, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court appears to have considered the manufacture of
the same product line as one of several relevant factors, the presence or
absence of any one of which is important but not controlling. The rele-
vance of continuing to manufacture the same product line with respect to
causing the injury in question is an important point that this Article will
take up later.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to approve the product
line exception. However, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, applying Pennsylvania law, relied on the
product line exception in a recent case.53
c. Duty to Warn
Before reviewing a number of important issues relating to the prod-
uct line exception, one other new approach to the question of successor
liability should be mentioned. Concurrently with the developments just
discussed, a number of jurisdictions have found a separate basis for
imposing liability on a successor-failure to warn customers of defects
in the predecessor's products that were discovered, or should have been
discovered, by the successor.54 Liability for failure to warn existing
users of a defective product sold by a predecessor may be imposed under
theories of strict liability, negligence, or failure of a successor to comply
with federal regulations that impose a duty to report product problems to
consumers or to warn prior purchasers of defects. Generally, courts
have noted that succession alone does not impose a duty to warn the
predecessor's customers of recently discovered defects. Rather, the duty
arises from a continuing relationship between the successor and the
predecessor's customers. Courts have required plaintiffs to prove such a
relationship before imposing successor liability for failure to warn.55
50. 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. 1981).
51. See id. at 108-10.
52. Id. at 111.
53. See Bogart v. Phase 11 Pasta Machs., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
54. See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing duty to warn cases).
55. See LaFountain v. Webb Indus. Corp., 951 F.2d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 1991).
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For instance, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that a "court must look at
factors such as the succession to service contracts, coverage of the par-
ticular machine by a contract, service of that machine by the successor,
and the successor's knowledge of the defect and of the machine owner's
location."56 In any event, because the existence of a duty to warn on the
part of a successor is a question of fact, the successor should be sensitive
to the possible presence of such a duty in any situation in which it may
be involved.
C. Important Issues Regarding the Product Line Exception
1. CHOICE OF LAW
The first and most important issue is choice of law. With Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey's adoption of the product line exception in the
years following the Turner and Ray decisions, it appeared that the new,
more liberal approach to successor liability would sweep the country.
The good news is that this has not been the case. Instead, recent cases
from a variety of states, such as New York, have rejected the product
line exception in favor of retaining the traditional rule on nonliability.5 7
In Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co.,58 the New York Court of
Appeals declined to adopt Ray's product line exception and Turner's
continuity of enterprise exception, but noted that both were factually
distinguishable from the case before it.5 9 The opinion is not entirely
clear as to the court's position on the product line and continuity excep-
tions. One lower court interprets the Schumacher opinion as rejecting
those exceptions in favor of adopting a rule requiring the successor to
warn.60 Another lower court reads Schumacher as leaving open the
issue of whether the New York Court of Appeals would adopt either the
56. Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 579 (10th Cir. 1989).
57. See Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754 (11. App. Ct. 1992); Hernandez v.
Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778 (11. App. Ct. 1979); Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830
P.2d 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982);
Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1985); DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417
N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1987); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); Pelc
v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Niccum v. Hydra Tool
Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986); Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Simoneau v.
South Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc.,
347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio
1987); Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson
Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984); Fish v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985).
58. 451 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983).
59. See id. at 198.
60. See Radziul v. Hooper, Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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product line or continuity of enterprise exceptions.6" The First Circuit
Court of Appeals has speculated that the Schumacher court intended to
reject the holdings in both Turner and Ray.62 Furthermore, in Howard v.
Clifton Hydraulic Press Co.,63 -the court, applying New York law,
declined to adopt either Turner or Ray under the facts presented.64 In
light of these cases, it is apparent that the New York Court of Appeals
has yet to resolve the confusion created by its decision in Schumacher.
Federal courts have also expressed reservations that the product
line or continuity of enterprise exceptions would be adopted by the
courts of Arkansas,65 Colorado,66 Iowa,67 Kentucky,6 I Louisiana,69
Maryland,7" Massachusetts, 7' Missouri, 72 Ohio,73 and Oregon.74
The bad news is that, notwithstanding the trend away from adopt-
ing the product line exception, the choice of law rule applied in suits
against successor corporations gives the product line and continuity of
enterprise exceptions wider applicability than they would otherwise
have. Consider, for example, the case of Hickman v. Thomas C. Thomp-
son Co.,"5 that was decided by the United States District Court for Colo-
rado in September 1984. In Hickman, the plaintiff was injured by
copper enameling products manufactured by a corporation that had sold
all of its assets to another corporation.76 The contract of sale was signed
and executed in Illinois where both corporations based their opera-
tions. 77 The plaintiff, however, was a resident of Colorado and was
injured by the products there. 78 The district court concluded that Colo-
rado law should govern the case and that the Colorado courts would
adopt the product line exception. 79 Thus, despite Illinois' rejection of
61. See Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food and Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245-46 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985).
62. See Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 858 n.I 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
63. 830 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
64. See id. at 711.
65. See Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Ark. 1988).
66. See Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989).
67. See Weaver v. Nash Int'l, Inc., 730 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1984).
68. See Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987).
69. See Page v. Gulf Oil Co., 812 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
70. See Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987 (D. Md. 1988).
71. See Dayton v. Peck, Stow and Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1984).
72. See Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981).
73. See Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
74. See Western Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 728 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Or.
1990).
75. 592 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Colo. 1984).
76. See id. at 1283.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1286-87.
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the product line exception, an Illinois business that purchased another
Illinois business pursuant to a contract signed in Illinois was held liable
under the product line exception because of an astute choice of forum by
the plaintiff.
Ironically, in Florom v. Elliott Mfg.,8" the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals had an opportunity to predict whether Colorado would adopt
the product line exception. The Florom court expressly disagreed with
the Hickman court's conclusion and held that Colorado would reject the
product line exception and continue to adhere to the traditional rule.8
The havoc caused by the unsettled state of the law of successor
liability and a choice of law rule that ultimately looks to the law of the
state where the injury occurred, is illustrated by the cases involving the
power presses manufactured by the Johnson Machine and Press Com-
pany.82 In 1956, Johnson transferred its assets and liabilities to Bon-
trager Corporation in exchange for Bontrager common stock.83
Bontrager continued to manufacture presses under the Johnson trade
name until 1962.84 At that time, Amsted Industries purchased all of
Bontrager's assets for cash.85 Amsted, or a subsidiary, continued to
manufacture presses under the Johnson trademark until 1975.86 Amsted
then sold the press manufacturing business to LWE, Inc., which also
continued to manufacture Johnson presses.87
Since then Amsted has litigated the issue of successor liability
many times. In 1975, two years before Ray, a California court held that
Amsted was not liable as a successor for defective products manufac-
tured by its predecessors.88 In 1978, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin, applying Wisconsin law, reached a
similar conclusion.8 9 In the next case involving Amsted's liability for
80. 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989).
81. See id. at 580.
82. See Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Wis. 1978). aff'd, 598''
F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1979); Diaz v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989);
Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe,
120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1992); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778 (I11. App. Ct. 1979); Jones v.
Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc.,
543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981); Fish v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985).
83. See Ortiz, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 557-58.
84. See id. at 558.
85. See id.
86. See Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 F.2d 1061, 1062 (7th Cir. 1979).
87. See id.
88. See Ortiz, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
89. See Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd, 598
F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1979).
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Johnson presses, Korzetz v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,"° the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan applied Turner's con-
tinuity exception to Michigan law and held Amsted liable as a succes-
sor.9 The same year, an Illinois court, applying Illinois law, rejected
Ray's product line exception and held that Amsted was not liable as a
successor.92 Two years later, New Jersey adopted the Ray approach and
applied it to Amsted.93 The following year, in Jones v. Johnson
Machine and Press Co.,94 the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the
product line exception and held that Amsted was not liable as a corpo-
rate successor.95 In 1985, in Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,96 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the product line exception and
held that Amsted was not liable as a successor corporation.97 In 1988, in
Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc.,98 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire held that New Hampshire does not recognize the product line
theory of successor liability and that, therefore, liability could not be
imposed on Amsted on this basis.99 Then, in 1989, in Diaz v. South
Bend Lathe, Inc., 00 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York held Amsted liable under New York's de facto merger
doctrine for an injury caused by a product manufactured by Johnson
Machine and Press. 01 Most recently, in Johnston v. Amsted Industries,
Inc.,102 the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Amsted could not be
held liable, because Colorado does not recognize the product line or con-
tinuity of enterprise theories of successor liability.10 3
To date, therefore, Amsted has litigated the issue of successor lia-
bility ten times, once each under the laws of California, Colorado, Mich-
igan, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, and Nebraska,
and twice under the law of Wisconsin. Amsted has won seven times and
lost three times-losing once under the Turner rule, once under Ray,
and once under a de facto merger theory. In sum, the experience of
Amsted Industries serves as an important warning that in the context of
the product line exception what is important in evaluating a potential
90. 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
91. See id. at 144-45.
92. See Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778, 779-81 (I11. App. 1979).
93. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
94. 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982).
95. See id. at 484.
96. 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985).
97. See id. at 829.
98, 543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988).
99. See id. at 409.
100, 707 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
101. See id. at 100-01.
102. 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1992).
103. See id. at 1147.
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acquisition is where the selling corporation-and its predecessors-have
distributed products that may be potentially dangerous.
This Article will now briefly mention several other issues, in addi-
tion to choice of law, that should further increase sensitivity to the prod-
uct line exception.
2. CONTINUATION OF THE PRODUCT LINE
The next issue is whether a court would hold a purchasing corpora-
tion liable if the purchasing corporation did not continue to manufacture
the product of the predecessor that caused the injury. As this Article
pointed out earlier, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ramirez rejected
the Turner case in favor of California's Ray case, which focused on the
continuation of the manufacture of the injurious product."° However,
the New Jersey Superior Court has recently expanded the product line
exception and allowed liability even when the company did not continue
producing the product. °5 In Pacius v. Thermtroll Corp., the court stated
that if the theory behind successor liability is to afford a remedy to the
plaintiff, any benefits received by purchasing the assets of the predeces-
sor should be enough to establish the product line exception. °6 This is
obviously an expansion of the product line exception. It will be interest-
ing to see if the New Jersey Supreme Court accepts this interpretation.
California courts, like the Pacius court, have not insisted on strict
continuation of the same product line as a prerequisite to finding liabil-
ity.' ° 7 In Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., the California Court of Appeal
held that a successor corporation may be liable even where the product
causing injury was not mass-produced and the successor did not con-
tinue the identical product line.' 0 8 The court concluded that this result
was consistent with the strict products liability rationale, which does not
require the party held liable to be morally responsible for the injuries
caused by the product. 0 9 Rather than require the injured party to bear
the loss, the court decided that the successor should bear the loss
because it was benefitting from the business and goodwill it had
purchased and was in a position to spread the costs of the injury." 0 It is
interesting to note a 1988 California Court of Appeal case in which the
plaintiff sought to have the product line exception applied to a negli-
104. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 818-19 (N.J. 1981).
105. See Pacius v. Thermtroll Corp., 611 A.2d 153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
106. See id. at 157.
107. See Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
108. Id. at 124.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 124-25.
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gence cause of action."' There the court held that the product line
exception only applies to causes of action based on strict liability."12
3. INTERMEDIATE SUCCESSOR
Another issue to be aware of is the problem faced by an intermedi-
ate successor. Even after a corporation has divested itself of assets
acquired from a previous owner, it may still be held liable for defective
products manufactured by the previous owner. In Nieves v. Bruno Sher-
man Corp., ' 3 decided the same day as Ramirez, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that an intermediate successor, who at the time of
injury no longer owned the assets associated with the manufacture of the
defective product, could nonetheless be held liable, as a successor to the
original owner, under the product line exception." 4
In Trimper v. Harris Corp.,' '5 a case involving the same company
that was the intermediate successor in the Nieves case, a federal district
court has also held that an intermediate successor may be liable under
the continuity of enterprise exception formulated in the Turner case." 6
In Tretter v. Rapid American Corp.,' 7 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri adopted Trimper."8 In Tretter, two
corporations had merged, and the court held that a successor corporation
which had merged with its predecessor was liable for the tort liabilities
of its predecessor, notwithstanding the fact that the successor corpora-
tion had since transferred responsibility for such liabilities to another
corporation." 9 Like the court in Trimper, the court in Tretter empha-
sized that its first concern was to compensate an injured plaintiff and
that any agreement between the successor corporations as to the proper
allocation of liability should not prevent the plaintiff's recovery. 20
It should be noted, however, to avoid any misunderstanding, that
the cases imposing liability on an intermediate successor have also con-
tinued to hold the ultimate successor liable. As in Tretter, courts will
generally honor an agreement allocating liability between successive
successors, but the plaintiff, in the first instance, is not to be deprived of
a potential source of recovery.' 2'
Ill. See Maloney v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
112. See id. at 5.
113. 431 A.2d 826 (N.J. 1981).
114. Id. at 828.
115. 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
116. Id. at 347.
117. 514 F. Supp. 1344 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
118. Id. at 1347.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
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4. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The final issue under the product line exception to be aware of is
the availability of punitive damages. In 1983, a federal district court
predicted that California would not grant punitive damages against suc-
cessor corporations under the product line exception and, accordingly,
granted summary judgment to the successor.' 22 However, in Martin v.
Johns-Manville Corp.,23 the Pennsylvania Superior Court, an intermedi-
ate appellate court, held that punitive damages could be awarded against
a successor corporation. 24 The court explained its decision as follows:
We believe that when a legal change in corporate identity is not
accompanied by major changes in the identity of the predecessor's
shareholders, officers, directors, and management personnel, the
imposition of punitive damages against the successor for the reckless
conduct of the predecessor may be proper as advancing the goals of
punishment and deterrence. For the actors responsible for the prede-
cessor's reckless conduct will be punished and also deterred from
similar conduct in the future. The fact that the successor does not
continue the product line recklessly marketed by the predecessor, or
cures the defect, will not necessarily preclude punitive damages. For
in either circumstance, the fact remains that those who are in control
of the successor have demonstrated a willingness to act in reckless
disregard of the rights of others. That the public is now safe from
being injured by product x does not mean it is safe from the next
reckless business practice these actors may undertake if not
deterred.125
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the
plaintiff had not produced evidence sufficient to warrant the submission
of his punitive damages claim to the jury. 126 The court observed that it
has never decided the question of whether punitive damages are avail-
able in an action grounded in strict liability for defective products and
declined to do so in the case before it.' 27 New Jersey has followed the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's lead in holding that punitive damages can
be awarded against a successor corporation.' 28 The New Jersey Supe-
rior Court in Brotherton v. Celotex Corp. noted that the imposition of
punitive damages against a successor corporation may be necessary to
122. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
123. See 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa.
1985).
124. Id. at 667.
125. Id.
126. See Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1100 (Pa. 1985).
127. See id. at 1094.
128. See Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
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protect the public from egregious conduct. 12 9 The Brotherton opinion,
however, emphasized that the successor corporation must be sufficiently
connected to the culpable conduct to warrant punitive damages. 30
The Superior Court of Delaware, in Sheppard v. A.C. and S Co.,' 31
also suggested that punitive damages may be recovered from a successor
corporation, particularly when the successor continues the manufacture
and distribution of the product line which it acquired from its predeces-
sor. The court stated that:
If, as the decisions indicate, deterrence is a policy goal supporting the
allowance of punitive damages, the continuation by a successor of a
product line with knowledge of its danger (as suggested by the affix-
ing of warning labels) could be a reprehensible act properly discour-
aged through the imposition of punitive damages.1 32
The court emphasized, however, that "punitive damages, in products lia-
bility cases, are assessable only for outrageous conduct and even in
jurisdictions which recognize strict liability an additional showing of
aggravated conduct is required. 133
The case law has indicated a greater willingness to impose punitive
damages where the successor corporation is the product of a statutory
merger, as was the case in Brotherton. This is because, in a statutory
merger, a successor corporation expressly undertakes to become liable
for all the liabilities of its predecessor, including any potential claims for
punitive damages. For example, the Celotex Corporation, as the succes-
sor corporation of a merger with Panacon Corporation, which itself was
the successor of a merger with the Philip Carey Corporation, has been
held liable for punitive damages as a result of the actions of its
predecessors. 134
5. LOSS OF REMEDY AGAINST PREDECESSOR AND CAUSATION
Some courts are looking beyond the claimant's need for compensa-
tion, to the fairness of imposing such liability on the successor corpora-
tion. In Conway v. White Trucks,135 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
129. Id. at 1344.
130. Id. at 1341.
131. 484 A.2d 521 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 526.
134. See Aguirre v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 901 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1990); Man v.
Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Haw. 1989); Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599
F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Iowa 1984); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa.
1982) affid sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985);
Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 459 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), aff'd, 490 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1986);
Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1992).
135. 885 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1989).
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examined the product line exception, as applied in Pennsylvania. The
Third Circuit, noting that a number of state courts had rejected the prod-
uct line exception, expressed doubts as to whether the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would adopt the exception in any form. 13 6 Assuming,
for purposes of argument, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
follow the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Dawejko,1 37 the
Third Circuit predicted that the supreme court "would not apply [the]
exception in cases where the claimant had a potential remedy against the
original manufacturer, but failed to exercise all available means to assert
his or her claim."' 38  The Third Circuit noted that one of the Ray
requirements for the product line exception is the virtual destruction of
the plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer because of the
successor's acquisition of the business.1 39 In Conway, the bankruptcy
court set aside a fund to accommodate claims such as those asserted by
the plaintiff.140 The Third Circuit concluded that it would be inappropri-
ate to impose liability on the successor where the plaintiff had an avail-
able remedy against the predecessor, but had failed to pursue that
remedy. 14 1
Two years later, the Third Circuit reaffirmed this view in LaFoun-
tain v. Webb Industries Corp.,42 where it declined to apply the product
line exception to a case because the plaintiff had a claim against the
predecessor manufacturer but failed to prove it.' 43
The Third Circuit's decisions in Conway and LaFountain are
instructive because they illustrate that some courts no longer impose lia-
bility on a successor corporation solely to compensate an injured plain-
tiff. Rather, courts have indicated a greater willingness to inquire into
the fairness of imposing such liability, particularly when the successor
corporation did not cause the destruction of the plaintiff's remedy
against the predecessor. 144
D. Practical Suggestions
A successor corporation may be held liable in an unforeseen juris-
diction for both punitive and compensatory damages because of a defec-
136. See id. at 93-95.
137. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
138. Conway, 885 F.2d at 95.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 91.
141. See id. at 97.
142. 951 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1991).
143. Id. at 545.
144. See also Tracey v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1990),
aff'd, 928 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1991); Holloway v. New Jersey, 566 A.2d 1177 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 593 A.2d 716 (N.J. 1991).
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tive product acquired from a predecessor. Such liability seems unfair,
especially if the successor corporation does not manufacture the product,
cured the defect, or was only an intermediate successor. However,
because it is a possibility, it is vital that the corporation structure an asset
acquisition to minimize the risk of successor liability.
A correct approach to the problem requires a business evaluation of
the realistic risks involved. Although the prospect of punitive damages
against, for example, an intermediate successor that has remedied a
defect in a product is cause for significant concern, the focus should be
on whether it would be economically efficient to restructure an acquisi-
tion to minimize such a possibility. Sometimes, it is better to allow the
acquisition to take another form without reference to the problem of suc-
cessor liability.
In any acquisition, it is critical to evaluate business considerations
that suggest a particular structure for an acquisition and the manner of
operating the business following the acquisition. The potential magni-
tude and location of product liability claims should be weighed against
those considerations. The product line acquired could be one that is not
inherently dangerous and has only been distributed in states, like Illi-
nois, that have decisively rejected the product line exception in a number
of cases. On the other hand, the products may be dangerous and may
have been distributed in states, like California and Pennsylvania, which
have adopted the product line exception to the traditional rule of
nonliability.
Assuming that the problem of successor liability is of some con-
cern, there are a number of ways to reduce the purchaser's risks. Atten-
tion should focus on the following: factors the courts have relied on to
justify the imposition of successor liability, agreements to indemnify the
purchaser if the seller continues in business, and allocations of liability
between various successors.
Rather than focusing on these generalized techniques here, it would
be more instructive to describe two specific situations which are of some
interest in this area.
The first situation involves a technique used to structure an acquisi-
tion for one of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius' English corporate clients.
The English company wanted to acquire the business of an American
company that had produced a product containing asbestos during the
1950's and 1960's. Although the American company was not an asbes-
tos manufacturer and the asbestos contained in the products it had manu-
factured was not particularly dangerous, the American company had
been named as a defendant in a number of personal injury suits. The
possibility that the American company would be held liable for an
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amount anywhere near the $50-60 million sought from all the defendants
was extremely remote, yet the English company was somewhat
concerned.
Exploration of the situation revealed that the acquisition was going
to be structured in a way that would clearly raise the issue of the product
line exception-the English company was going to purchase all of the
American company's assets and continue its business, and the American
company was going to be dissolved.
The English company wanted to confine potential liability as much
as possible. Consequently, an American subsidiary of the English com-
pany was incorporated and capitalized with a sufficient amount of cash
to complete the acquisition and provide working capital for initial opera-
tions. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius provided a detailed opinion on how to
operate the American subsidiary so that the corporate veil between the
American subsidiary and its English parent would not be pierced. At
that point, the English company could at least be confident that its maxi-
mum exposure was limited to the amount of its investment.
The next step in the acquisition is what made the transaction
unique. The English company then secured a "sleep easy" insurance
policy through a New York insurance broker. Lloyd's of London spe-
cially wrote the policy to cover the amount of the English company's
initial investment in its American subsidiary. Assuming that the policy
survives scrutiny, the English company only risks losing the American
subsidiary's profits.
A second interesting situation in this area is the acquisition of a
company that is in reorganization. The basic rule to remember is that
acquiring the business of a company that is in reorganization-even
with the benefit of a bankruptcy court order stating that the assets are
transferred free and clear of liabilities-does not guarantee that the
acquiring corporation will not be held liable as the successor of the cor-
poration in reorganization.
There are a few cases to be aware of in this context. The first case
is In re Mooney Aircraft, Inc. 14 5 The original Mooney Aircraft company
filed a bankruptcy petition in 1969.146 The bankruptcy court subse-
quently approved a sale of the assets of Mooney Aircraft free and clear
of all claims and liabilities other than properly secured liens.' 47 The
assets were then sold two more times before coming to rest in a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Republic Steel Corporation. 14 8 After the sales, the
145. 730 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1984).
146. See id. at 369.
147. See id. at 371.
148. See id. at 379.
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families of two men who died in a crash brought a products liability suit
in California against the Republic Steel subsidiary seeking to hold it
liable as the successor of Mooney Aircraft for a defective plane manu-
factured prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 4 9 Upon applica-
tion by the Republic Steel subsidiary, the bankruptcy court reopened the
estate of Mooney Aircraft and entered an order enjoining the prosecution
of the California products liability case. 5 ° The Fifth Circuit ultimately
held that the injunction was improper because the bankruptcy court did
not have the power to sell the assets of Mooney Aircraft free and clear of
claims by victims of an accident that had not yet occurred.' 5' Therefore,
Mooney Aircraft stands for the proposition that a bankruptcy proceeding
is not an adequate mechanism to protect against the imposition of suc-
cessor liability for claims which have not accrued at the time of the
bankruptcy proceeding.
The second case to be aware of is Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 52 which was decided in 1985. Unlike Mooney, the Schweitzer
case did not involve a successor corporation, but rather the extent of the
discharge of liability of the reorganized company itself. The Reading
Railroad was one of the bankrupt northeast railroads whose rail assets
were transferred to Conrail in 1976 pursuant to federal statute.' 53 Fol-
lowing the transfer of its rail assets to Conrail, the Reading Company
was reorganized essentially as a real estate holding company. After the
reorganization was consummated, former Reading railroad employees
who had been exposed to asbestos while working on the railroad brought
a series of personal injury suits. 154 The Third Circuit held that the
injured employees' claims arose at the point when they showed evidence
of diseaseI 55-which was after the consummation of the Reading reor-
ganization-and that they thus did not have claims that could be dis-
charged by the bankruptcy court. 56
Schweitzer should be read in conjunction with In re Erie Lack-
awanna Railway Co.' 57 Although the facts of Erie are similar to those
of Schweitzer, the court in Erie denied the plaintiffs relief because it
found that the entity that survived the bankruptcy proceeding was the
product of a liquidation rather than a reorganization. 8 Thus, the Erie
149. See id. at 37 1.
150. See id. at 372.
151. See id. at 375.
152. 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985).
153. See id. at 940.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 942.
156. See id. at 944.
157. 803 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1986).
158. Id. at 883-84.
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court did not address the issue in Schweitzer regarding the extent of
discharge.
In In re Penn Central Transportation Co., ' the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania allowed plaintiffs
who had been exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCB's") while
employed by Penn Central Transportation Company to assert claims for
that exposure against Penn Central Corporation, the corporation which
came into existence upon the reorganization of the Penn Central Trans-
portation Company. 6 ° Although the bankruptcy court issued an order
exonerating the reorganized company from all tort claims, the district
court, relying on Mooney and Schweitzer, concluded that the order could
not discharge claims which had not accrued at the time of the reorgani-
zation proceeding.' 6'
In cases where Morgan, Lewis & Bockius represented clients who
acquired the assets of a company in reorganization and faced a possibil-
ity of significant contingent tort liability, the firm has requested express
consent and waiver of claims from any involved unions. Note, however,
that this procedure only protects clients from liability to employees and
does not help in the case of injured third parties, such as in Mooney.
II. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ISSUES
Whether the transaction is a stock acquisition, an asset acquisition,
or a merger, the transactional lawyer must perform three distinct tasks
relating to employee benefit plans. These tasks must be completed in
order, because each is derived from the task immediately preceding it.
The first task that the transaction lawyer must undertake may be
labeled the "identification and classification" task. It naturally subdi-
vides into two parts. The first part of the task involves discovering and
analyzing prior, current, and anticipated ownership relationships involv-
ing the target company. This discovery and analysis is critical because it
defines the universe within which the transaction lawyer must look to
find the benefit plans that must be examined in the second phase. Many
of the provisions of ERISA and some of the key employee benefit provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code pierce the traditional corporate veil,
aggregating enterprises for liability or tax benefit eligibility testing pur-
poses. An enterprise related only by a parent-subsidiary, brother-sister,
common ownership (including ownership determined by applying attri-
bution rules), or affiliated service group relationship to one or more
other enterprises may form, with those related enterprises, a statutory
159. 92 B.R. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
160. See id. at 613.
161. See id. at 609-10.
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universe in which they share joint and several liability for certain benefit
plan obligations of any number of members of that universe. If the tar-
get company was or is a member of such a common control universe, it
may have substantial potential liability in respect to benefit plans that it
never sponsored or maintained and that never covered any of its
employees.
The target company may also have determined, or assumed, that
certain of its benefit plans were eligible for tax-favored treatment on the
basis of having met certain coverage or benefit testing criteria under the
Internal Revenue Code. In many cases, the Code requires that such test-
ing be based on an aggregated enterprise data base where a common
control universe exists, treating all such related enterprises as a single
employer. Experience indicates that such aggregate base testing require-
ments are often misunderstood and assumed to be inapplicable or over-
looked. Thus, claimed tax benefits may be lost retroactively upon audit
when the testing is redone on an aggregated universe basis.
After defining the universe of companies whose benefit plans are
relevant to the transaction, it is time to turn to the second part of the first
task, identifying and classifying the benefit plans which raise concern
and the circumstances that brought about those plans. In making inquir-
ies, "employee benefit plan" should be defined broadly, extending well
beyond the ERISA definition, 62 in order to learn as much as possible
and to establish the basis for liability and risk assessment.
"Employee welfare benefit plans" and "welfare plans" are within
the scope of ERISA as long as they are not limited to proprietors, part-
ners, or shareholders, and their respective spouses.' 6 3 Under ERISA, a
"pension plan" is a plan providing for retirement income benefits or
deferral of compensation to or beyond the end of covered employ-
ment. 64 Shorter term deferral arrangements are not within the purview
of ERISA. "Welfare plans" include plans which provide for:
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event
of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care cen-
ters, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or ... any benefit
described in section 186(c) [of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947] (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to
provide such pensions).' 65
Therefore, inquiry as to "employee benefit plans" limited to
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994) (defining "employee benefit plan").
163. See id. § 1002(1).
164. See id. § 1002(2)(A).
165. Id. § 1002(I)(A)-(B).
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arrangements falling within the ERISA definition of "employee benefit
plan" would include any of the following types of plans of which the
intelligent buyer must be cognizant: current or short-term deferred
incentive bonus arrangements; most stock-based compensation arrange-
ments, such as incentive or non-qualified stock options, restricted stock
arrangements, stock appreciation rights, phantom stock plans, and
employee stock purchase plans; adoption assistance plans; payroll prac-
tices; employee discounts; accumulated unused vacation and compensa-
tory time off; pay in lieu of sick pay, such as attendance incentive
programs; paid leaves of absence or sabbaticals; individual deferred
compensation arrangements appearing as clauses in personal service and
employment contracts; and cafeteria and flexible spending account
plans.
During the discovery and classification process, financial, actuarial,
and insurance information should also be examined. Such examination
will enable the client to decide which plans should be terminated by the
seller before closing, which plans the client is willing to take over, and
which plans leave the client with little practical choice, such as those to
which the target company was committed under a collective bargaining
agreement by which the purchaser must agree to be bound. The plan
identification and classification process will highlight the favorable
planning opportunities that may be present, the perils and exposures
from which the client needs protection, the corporate culture and
employee expectations that may be encountered in the target company,
and the potential impact, if any, of the acquisition on the client's benefit
plans.
Once the discovery and classification phase is completed, the trans-
action lawyer can turn to the second step-the assessment of the liability
the client may incur because of the purchase, and the financial risk asso-
ciated with the benefit plans. This assessment ultimately results in rep-
resentations and warranties, seller's covenants, indemnifications,
establishment of conditions precedent to closing, pre- and post-closing
undertakings, and purchase price and post-closing adjustments. The fol-
lowing list suggests some, but by no means all, of the issues that might
need to be addressed, depending on the nature of the plans discovered in
the identification and classification phase:
(1) In the case of single-employer defined benefit pension plans, liability
under Title IV of ERISA to the plans, to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, or both, regardless of whether the plans involved were
sponsored by the target company or by an enterprise in its commonly
controlled universe;
(2) Withdrawal liability in connection with one or more multi-employer
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pension plans, regardless of whether the plans involved were plans cov-
ering employees of the target company, or employees of an enterprise in
the target company's commonly controlled universe;
(3) Excise tax liability, civil liability, or general liability for engagement
in "prohibited transactions," as defined in the Code or ERISA, regard-
less of whether the plan involved was a plan sponsored by the target
company;
(4) Disallowance of deductions taken for contributions or benefits pro-
vided under a plan intended to be tax-benefitted, such as tax-qualified
retirement plans or medical expense plans, if the plan failed to meet the
Code conditions for the tax benefit;
(5) Obligations to install new plans or to increase benefits, sometimes
retroactively, usually under collective bargaining agreements;
(6) Penalties for failure to fully satisfy all reporting and disclosure obli-
gations on a timely basis;
(7) Excise taxes and other penalties to commence benefit payments
when required, to hold employer securities in an ESOP for the pre-
scribed holding period, to meet minimum funding requirements on a
timely basis, to withhold income tax (or wage taxes) at the source, to
satisfy COBRA requirements, and for payment of excess fringe benefits,
for prohibited allocation of employer securities under certain ESOPs,
and for material overstatement of pension liabilities;
(8) Liability for failure to provide "employee" benefits to persons retro-
actively deemed to be "employees" and previously treated as "independ-
ent contractors;"
(9) Disallowance of deductions in connection with pension funding
where the actuarial assumptions on the basis of which funding was done
are retroactively determined by the Internal Revenue Service to have
been unreasonable;
(10) Penalties for failure to make required quarterly contributions to
pension plans, to report "reportable events," to pay timely or sufficient
premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and to provide
security for the future funding of benefit increases resulting from a plan
amendment;
(11) Liabilities arising from the indemnification by the target company
of others, particularly service providers and fiduciaries;
(12) Liability in connection with improperly denied claims for benefits;
(13) In the case of non-ERISA plans, liabilities and penalties for state
law violations, and in the case of ERISA plans, liabilities and penalties
for violation of those state laws which are not superseded by ERISA,
such as state laws governing insurance, banking, and taxes;
(14) Liabilities and penalties for violations of federal laws other than
ERISA that may apply to benefit plans, including the Age Discrimina-
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tion in Employment Act of 1967,166 the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990,167 the Uniformed Service Employees Reemployment Rights
Act of 1994,168 civil rights acts, gender discrimination acts, or other
applicable law;
(15) Possibility of claims by the Department of Defense to recover
"excess" pension costs paid in an earlier cycle, if the target is a defense
contractor;
(16) The results of any possible agency compliance audit, including loss
of tax-exempt status if there was a failure to obtain a timely ruling, such
as might be the case with a VEBA;
(17) Economic loss for failure to make full contributions for service
through the closing date, or to pay all premiums due for coverages pro-
vided through the closing date;
(18) Acceleration of vesting and benefit entitlement, expiration of
restrictions on securities, or any other enhancement of benefits based on
the change of control contemplated in the acquisition transaction itself;
(19) Effect of the transaction on and changes in accrued bonus pools and
other incentive pay measuring devices;
(20) Proper resolution of problems associated with benefit plans that are
stock-based, such as options and restricted shares, or that measure non-
stock benefits by stock price performance, stock appreciation rights and
phantom stock arrangements, for example.
Fully developing and quantifying all of these exposures may
require the assistance of other professionals, such as appraisers and actu-
aries. After completion of this task, the third, and often most difficult
task, must be addressed. The parties must now negotiate who will bear
the certain cost of each calculable expense, who will bear the risk as to
the many contingent exposures involved, and how benefit-based dis-
putes will be resolved in the future.
Because of the several steps involved and the time that accomplish-
ing those steps can consume, it is best for the transactional lawyer who
is not a benefits expert to involve his or her benefits people in the trans-
action earlier rather than later. The more thoroughly tasks one and two,
the identification and quantification processes, are performed, the easier
it is to address the benefit issues and to prevail in negotiation.
166. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
167. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
168. See Pub. L. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. and 5
U.S.C. § 8432(b) (1994)).
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A. Sample Seller's Representations and Warranties Relating to
Employee Benefit Plans
In a hypothetical transaction involving a sale by an unrelated third
party of all of the stock of Country Transit, Inc. ("CTI") to Penny Rich
(to purchase a seventy percent interest) and to an ESOP to be established
(to purchase a thirty percent interest), the following scenarios will illus-
trate the use of seller's representations and warranties. Representations
and warranties made by CTI are not of much value to buyers, because
they will own CTI after closing. In an asset sale transaction, buyers
would want CTI's representations and warranties as well. However, in
an asset sale, buyers would be less concerned about certain potential
liabilities with respect to which representations and warranties are sug-
gested below.
(1) All of CTI's benefit plans, including "non-ERISA" plans, have been
identified.
Sample: Schedule A is a complete list of all employee benefit
plans, whether formal or informal, whether or not set forth in writing,
and whether covering one person or more than one person, sponsored or
maintained by CTI or to which CTI makes contributions. For the pur-
poses hereof, the term "employee benefit plan" includes all plans, funds,
programs, policies, arrangements, practices, customs and understandings
providing benefits of economic value to any employee, former
employee, or present or former beneficiary, dependent or assignee of
any such employee or former employee other than regular salary, wages
or commissions paid substantially concurrently with the performance of
the services for which paid. Without limitation to the same, the term
"employee benefit plan" includes all employee welfare benefit plans
within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"), and all employee pension
benefit plans within the meaning of section 3(2) of ERISA. Schedule A
is marked to indicate (a) each plan listed therein which is intended to
meet the qualification requirements of section 401(a), 403(a) or 405(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"); (b)
each plan listed therein all of the benefits of which are funded through
contracts of insurance; and (c) each plan listed therein which is intended
to be exempt from income tax or to provide benefits that are tax-
advantaged to the recipients.
(2) Seller has presented for examination CTI plan documents that are
complete and accurate. The financial information relating to each Plan is
complete and properly reflects the assets and liabilities of each plan.
Sample. CTI has delivered to Buyers a true, correct and complete
copy of every plan document memorializing provisions of each plan
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identified in Schedule A, including all amendments and modifications to
each. 169 As to each funded employee benefit plan, CTI has delivered to
Buyers the most recent annual financial report with respect to such plan,
any subsequent interim report, and, as to each defined benefit pension
plan, CTI has delivered to Buyers the most recent actuarial valuation
completed with respect to such plan. Each such financial report is a
substantially accurate description of the financial status of the subject
employee benefit plan, and there have been no material adverse changes
in the financial status of any such employee benefit plan since the date
of the most recent report provided with respect thereto.
(3) CTI has not entered into any contractual commitment to continue the
operation of any of the plans or to increase benefits under any of the
plans.
Sample: Except as specifically set forth in its current collective
bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local XYZ, a true
and correct copy of which has been delivered by CTI to Buyers, and
except as provided under applicable state worker's compensation laws,
CTI is not obligated, contractually, or by operation of law, to either con-
tinue in operation any employee benefit plan.
(4) Plans intended to be tax-qualified under the Internal Revenue Code
are tax-qualified and plans otherwise intended to satisfy Code nondis-
crimination requirements do satisfy those requirements.
Sample: As to each pension, profit-sharing or other plan identified
in Schedule A as being tax-qualified, all of the following are true:
(a) The plan, in form and operation, currently satisfies, and for all years
subsequent to the establishment of such plan and with respect to which
the Corporation's tax returns are open to audit, has satisfied, the qualifi-
cation requirements of section 401(a), 403(a) or 405(a) of the Code, as
applicable.
(b) The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has issued a favorable Letter
of Determination or Opinion Letter with respect to the plan as amended
to date, and all amendments required by the Code as a condition of
retention of such qualified status as of the date, hereof have been
adopted.
(c) The IRS has not revoked any Letter of Determination or Opinion
Letter to which reference is made in paragraph (b) hereof, nor has the
IRS threatened any such revocation.
169. Such documents include, without limitation, plan documents, benefit schedules, insurance
contracts and other funding vehicles, and published announcements, policy statements, procedures
and similar instruments constituting the articulation of the provisions of any such employee
benefit plan.
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(d) The IRS is not presently auditing, nor has it indicated an intention to
audit any such plan; and no matter relating to any such plan is presently
under consideration under any voluntary compliance or closing agree-
ments program.
(e) Each other plan subject to Code nondiscrimination requirements cur-
rently satisfies, in both form and operation, and has satisfied such non-
discrimination requirements as were applicable for all years with respect
to which CTI's tax returns are open to audit.
(5) CTI has no imputed liability from any other entity under either the
Code or ERISA.
Sample: CTI is not now and has not been for a period of at least six
years ending on the date of this agreement (a) a part of a controlled
group of corporations within the meaning of section 414(a) of the Code,
(b) a trade or business constituting a part of a group of trades or busi-
nesses under common control within the meaning of section 414(b) of
the Code, (c) an entity constituting part of an affiliated service group
within the meaning of section 414(m) of the Code, or (d) an entity that
must be aggregated for any purpose with any other entity under section
414(o) of the Code.
(6) CTI's liability under Title IV of ERISA is both limited and
quantified.
Sample: Other than as to the pension to which CTI contributes on
behalf of its Teamster member employees (the "Teamster Pension
Fund"), CTI does not now, and has not for a period of at least six years,
contributed to or maintained any pension plan subject to Title IV of
ERISA and has no liability with respect to any such plan. As to the
Teamster Pension Fund, CTI has no current withdrawal liability in con-
nection therewith, and the consummation of the transaction contem-
plated by this agreement will not result in any such liability. If CTI were
to withdraw from the Teamster Pension Fund as of the date hereof, its
maximum withdrawal liability would not exceed $ _.
(7) CTI's obligation to fund plans is limited and satisfied.
Sample: Except as to the Teamster Pension Fund, CTI neither
sponsors nor maintains any pension plan subject to the minimum fund-
ing requirements of sections 412 of the Code or 302 of ERISA. All con-
tributions payable to any qualified employee benefit plan for any plan
year or fiscal year of CTI ending prior to the date hereof have been paid
in full, or are fully reflected on the financial statements of CTI which
have been provided to the Buyers. All premiums payable with respect to
insurance providing coverages in force up to the closing date have been
or by closing date will be paid in full. All amounts withheld from
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employee compensation to fund benefit plans prior to closing date will
have been deposited to such plans as of closing date.
(8) CTI has no excise tax or penalty liability exposure.
Sample: Neither CTI nor any person or entity indemnified by CTI
has engaged in, or entered into any binding agreement to engage in, any
transaction or other conduct which may result in imposition on CTI of
liability, directly or through such indemnification, for (a) any excise tax
under sections 4971 through 4980(B), inclusive, of the Code, (b) any
civil liability under section 502 of ERISA, (c) any criminal penalty
under section 1954 of the U.S. Criminal Code, or (d) any other material
economic sanction under any applicable law or regulation relating to
benefit plan operation.
(9) Current status of regulatory agency matters.
Sample: Neither Seller nor CTI has any knowledge of any investi-
gation, proceedings, administrative review or other administrative
agency process which could result in imposition on CTI of any penalty
or other assessment in connection with any of the employee benefit
plans identified in Schedule A. Neither Seller nor CTI has any knowl-
edge of any circumstance, condition or conduct that could result in
imposition upon CTI of any tax liability, penalty, interest charge or other
assessment in connection with any employee benefit plan sponsored or
maintained by CTI if such plan were to be audited by any regulatory
agency.
(10) CTI has complied with reporting, disclosure and tax withholding
requirements.
Sample: CTI has filed or caused to be filed on a timely basis each
and every return, report, statement, notice, declaration and other docu-
ment required by any governmental agency, federal, state and local
(including, without limitation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Depart-
ment of Labor, the PBGC and the Securities and Exchange Commission)
with respect to each employee benefit plan sponsored or maintained by
CTI.
(11) CTI has delivered or caused to be delivered to every participant,
beneficiary, alternate payee, or other party entitled to such material, all
plan descriptions, returns, reports, schedules, notices, statements and
similar materials, including, without limitation, summary plan descrip-
tions, summary annual reports, individual reports of accrued benefits,
and documentation required by regulation in connection with denied
claims for benefits (where applicable) under Title I of ERISA, under the
Code, under applicable securities laws, or under regulations with respect
to any of the foregoing. CTI and its appointed plan administrators, are
in compliance in all material respects, with statutory and regulatory
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requirements relating to communications with, and solicitation of elec-
tions and consents from, persons covered by, or having an entitlement to
benefits under, each employee benefit plan sponsored by CTI.
CTI has withheld and remitted to the proper depository all income
taxes and wage taxes on benefits derived under its employee benefit
plans, to the extent such withholding is required by law.
(12) CTI has no stock-based benefit programs.
Sample: CTI has no benefit plan or program and no compensation
arrangement which relates to the stock of CTI.170
(13) CTI has generally complied with applicable law-including securi-
ties laws, age discrimination rules, civil rights acts, and rules relating to
disability and family leave.
Sample: CTI has operated, and has caused its appointees and nomi-
nees to operate, each and every employee benefit plan identified on
Schedule A or improperly omitted from said Schedule in a manner
which is in material compliance with all applicable law, regulations, and
administrative agency rules and requirements applicable thereto. Every
employee, former employee, and every dependent of the foregoing enti-
tled to continuation of benefit coverage under any employee welfare
benefit plan sponsored by CTI has been accorded all of the rights to
which such person is entitled as a matter of law or regulation. Neither
CTI nor any person or entity indemnified by CTI has engaged in any act
which constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.
(14) There is no threatened litigation against CTI in connection with its
benefit plans.
Sample: Except as to claims for benefits in the ordinary course,
none of which are extraordinary in magnitude, neither Seller nor CTI has
any knowledge of any action, claim, demand, grievance or allegation of
unfair labor practice of any kind brought or threatened by any potential
claimant or representative of such claimant under any employee benefit
plan identified on Schedule A where CTI may be either (a) liable
directly on such action, claim or demand; or (b) obligated to indemnify
any person, group of persons or entity with respect to such action, claim
or demand.
(15) Seller will fund bookkeeper's special annuity before closing.
Sample: Seller will secure the bookkeeper's acknowledgement that
the lifetime payment promise was personal to Seller and NOT a corpo-
rate obligation of CTI, and that Seller will purchase at his own expense
and deliver to the bookkeeper a fully paid single premium annuity pro-
viding for a lifetime benefit of $15,000 per annum. The contract will be
170. There are no outstanding stock options, restricted stock shares, stock appreciation rights,
or phantom stock plans.
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held in trust by the Seller, with monthly installments payable to CTI
during bookkeepers continued tenure, and to bookkeeper thereafter.1 7'
(16) Seller's representations and warranties will survive closing.
Sample: Notwithstanding any other limitation on the duration of
the warranties set forth in this Agreement, the warranties set forth in this
Article shall be true as of the date hereof, and as of the closing date.
Those warranties will survive the closing date by five (5) years and dam-
ages for breaches thereof shall not be subject to any deductible.
There are many other representations and warranties to be made by
seller, including all standard representations and warranties concerning
the corporate status of CTI, CTI's financials, any real estate that CTI
owns (such as truck terminals), CTI's ownership of its assets, and all of
CTI's contractual and debt obligations. Because this hypothetical trans-
action involves a licensed trucking operation and a warehouse in which
food was stored, the seller should also be required to make representa-
tions and warranties relating to the following: (1) The validity and
transferability of licenses and operating certificates; (2) environmental
matters; 7 2 (3) OSHA compliance, and (4) sanitation and product liabil-
ity. Because food warehouses are notorious for inadequate refrigeration,
vermin infestation, and related problems, and particularly if a state
department of agriculture inspects the warehouse before renewing its
license, the buyers should establish as a condition precedent to closing
that the warehouse meet all applicable standards.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
A. Identifying and Managing Environmental Risks in a Corporate
Acquisition
Federal and state environmental agencies have recently made
efforts to transform their regulations from a "command and control" sys-
tem that specifies costly technologies in all cases to one based on flexi-
bility and case-specific risk assessment. The effect of this change on
transactions is not yet clear. New opportunities to clean contaminated
sites to satisfy reasonable standards and obtain relief from liability for
conditions created in the past are offset by difficulties in obtaining a
clear agreement with the government to set the terms of the cleanup and
171. Item 15 is probably more properly a seller's covenant and a condition precedent to
closing. This problem might also be addressed by having CTI and the bookkeeper enter into a
"split dollar" life insurance arrangement, a "retired life reserve" contract, or an annuitized
nonqualified retirement plan, although each such device involves tax planning considerations
beyond the scope of this exercise.
172. Truck terminals are often sites where oil, fuel, and other pollutants have accumulated or
been dumped.
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release. Athough clear statutory limits on lender liability have largely
resolved lenders' environmental concerns, problems with the assess-
ment, in terms of aggregate potential cost, of existing environmental
contamination problems and future operating compliance costs remain.
New management tools such as the ASTM investigation standards and
ISO 14000 compliance standards have not reduced the need for exper-
ienced judgment in the final assessment of the acquisition.
Since the mid-1980's, environmental risks have assumed an ever-
increasing role in corporate acquisitions as potential "deal breakers."
Environmental agencies at all levels of government have implemented
programs aimed at preventing future contamination and cleaning up
existing contamination that require expensive measures to collect and
treat the contaminants. The cost of cleaning up contamination has gen-
erally dwarfed the cost of pollution controls for daily operations, largely
because of the tremendous volume of material that must be managed in
order to collect and treat toxic materials that dispersed into the environ-
ment over many years.
The standards for both pollution control and pollution cleanup are
constantly changing. Laboratory tests are offered as proof of the poten-
tial hazards of toxic materials at very low levels. In the past, to avoid
difficult decisions, legislators and regulators alike have taken the path of
least resistance and required the elimination of all risks from exposure to
man-made toxic materials, regardless of costs or benefits. As each suc-
cessive generation of treatment becomes available and is installed, advo-
cates have presented evidence that even tighter standards were needed to
avoid all risk, causing regulators to impose tighter standards, which
required costly new forms of treatment.
More recent environmental policies have modified this approach to
cleanup standards in favor of protecting only against realistic exposure
risks. Although technology forcing standards continue to tighten pollu-
tion controls for new or modified operating plants, agencies are willing
to look at all plant operations and allow the reductions to be achieved in
the most cost-effective manner. These "risk-based" and emission "bub-
ble" policies can dramatically reduce environmental costs. Therefore,
corporate transactions can be focused on more positive aspects of the
deal. Questions remain, however, as to how far these changes have
progressed and what the current approaches to assessing environmental
risks in corporate transactions are?
B. Identifying Problems and the Nature of the Risks
The most significant legal concepts in environmental law are strict
liability, joint and several liability, and overlapping federal/state juris-
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diction. The first concept, strict liability, dates back to Fletcher v.
Rylands,1 73 an English case decided in 1865. In Fletcher, a person who
engages in a use of property which is allowed, despite its known
hazards, because of its social utility, should be liable for all resulting
damages without regard to fault.' 74 Sometimes this rule is read to elimi-
nate tort law's causation requirement. Section 9607 of the Federal Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act 75 ("Superfund") states that any person who owns or operates a con-
taminated site, transports waste there for disposal, or generates the waste
that ended up at the site is liable for all cleanup costs incurred by anyone
doing a cleanup in accordance with government regulations.' 76 This
broad, statutory strict liability has been used to place responsibility on
current owners and operators of companies for the cleanup of contami-
nation from past spills and disposal, in a manner that avoids judicial
invalidation as retroactive legislation.1 77
Joint and several liability has raised the notoriety of the Superfund
program. Under this doctrine, although hundreds of companies may
have sent waste to a landfill, the government may clean up the landfill
and then recover the cost of the cleanup in an action against a single
company. The company that paid for the cleanup has claims against all
of the other companies for reimbursement for their fair share of the
cleanup costs. This prospect, however, is hardly comforting to a com-
pany that produced one percent of the waste and is adjudged liable for
the entire amount. For publicly-traded companies, major reporting and
accounting problems will exist, even if the payments to the government
are phased until the contribution claims can be brought to judgment. 7 1
Finally, management of environmental problems is complicated by
the dual regulation in this area. Both the federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and each state environmental agency has the power to set
standards and enforce them. Federal preemption is curbed by statute.
Inconsistent requirements may hamper the management of technically
173. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.- E. & I.
App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
174. See id.
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
176. See id. § 9607(1)(a). This is called the National Contingency Plan. See id. § 9607(d)(1).
177. For cases discussing strict liability under Superfund, see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2420 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1988); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
178. For a discussion of joint and several liability under Superfund, see Redwing Carriers Inc.
v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1996); Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron
Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (N.D. Fla. 1995); South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Montalvo,
1989 WL 260215 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Bulk Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp.
1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
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simple problems, and settlements with only one level of government
may not be conclusive or binding on other levels. Most environmental
statutes expressly preserve the states' right to co-regulate in the subject
area of the legislation. 79
There are two basic types of environmental problems-those aris-
ing from current operations and those resulting from prior releases of
hazardous or toxic materials. In either case, the potential costs are simi-
lar-costs of treatment or remediation, costs of enforcement actions or
penalties, and costs of claims made by neighbors who have suffered per-
sonal injury or loss of property value as a result of the pollution. Gov-
ernment actions and standards largely determine the size of the first two
types of costs. Juries, however, decide the size of the third type, making
the amount much more difficult to predict.
The costs of meeting environmental standards in an ongoing opera-
tion can vary. They may include administrative costs-the costs of
determining the applicable requirements; applying for permits; negotiat-
ing specific terms; collecting samples; testing samples for specific con-
stituents or general physical, chemical, and biological characteristics;
filing reports; and operating and maintaining systems for treatment and
disposal of wastes in compliance with the law. There are also periodic
costs of changing these systems as business operations change and of
upgrading systems as environmental standards and requirements change.
Another basic issue in ongoing operations is compliance, that is,
the enforcement status of the facilities under consideration for acquisi-
tion. There are an enormous number of standards for air emissions;
wastewater management; solid waste collection, transportation, and dis-
posal; facility expansion; worker exposure and safety; and general pro-
tection of the environment. With so many different standards, a
company can easily miss various requirements. But with penalties of
$25,000 per day for each violation, most companies cannot afford to
have violations piling up unnoticed for too many days. The good news
is that most violation cases are settled for much less than the statutory
maximum. The bad news is that such settlements may still range from
thousands of dollars to millions of dollars, depending on the quality of
the company's relationships with the environmental regulators. Deter-
mining the outstanding violations and the likely cost of settlement
requires careful review of records, questioning of plant and corporate
personnel, and a high level of experience, skill, and knowledge of due
diligence team members.
Past release of hazardous substances may result in tremendous
179. See Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act § 3006, 42 U.S.C. 6926(d) (1994); Clean Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. 7416 (1994).
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costs for investigating the extent of the damages, determining the appro-
priate remedy, and implementing the remedy, as well as the administra-
tive costs of these efforts. The best known environmental program for
such remediation is the Superfund program, but similar programs
abound under state law in a variety of different statutes, such as a state
Superfund law, an underground storage tank law, or a traditional air
water or solid waste pollution control law. Remedial costs often domi-
nate this consideration, running into millions of dollars, but investigative
costs frequently run into hundreds of thousands of dollars. When the
liability for remediation is shared jointly and severally among many par-
ties, as is often the case for the cleanup of public and commercial dispo-
sal facilities, the individual costs of participating in meetings or
litigation may exceed the company's remedial cost share.
When considering liability for past releases of hazardous sub-
stances, it is important to look at the corporate history in detail. Every
location at which the company ever operated becomes a potential
Superfund claim. Moreover, because persons who generate waste and
send it offsite for disposal may be jointly and severally liable for the
cleanup of the disposal site, each waste disposal or treatment site may be
a source of future liability. Even waste treatment may be a liability if
the treatment is not done carefully or the wastes are mishandled in
transit or at the destination.
Superfund liability arises when the cleanup occurs, regardless of
the time of actual disposal. Although liability may diminish over time
due to the loss of records identifying waste owners, this can cut both
ways. Missing information may increase the share of the cleanup costs
the unlucky companies identified at the site must pay, because joint and
several liability makes those companies liable for the entire cleanup
cost.
Private claims brought by the neighbors of contaminated plants are
a rapidly growing area of liability.'10 As tort lawyers start sharing infor-
mation about the bases for claims, experts begin rendering opinions that
particular exposures caused identifiable damages, and the government
grants access to databases recording companies' release of contami-
nants, individual and class action suits are targeting an increasing
number of cleanup sites. Some of these cases settle for amounts which
are small in comparison with the cleanup costs. However, in each case,
there is a risk that one case might result in a jury verdict involving a
large class of plaintiffs and an award of millions of dollars. The right to
a jury trial in private damage cases makes a risk estimate a matter of
180. Worker claims, which are not discussed in this Article, fall within a special area of
liability covered by state law.
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guesswork requiring a high degree of experience and judgment to reduce
the uncertainty.
C. Avoiding Risk-The Form of the Transaction
When environmental risks began to increase dramatically, the ini-
tial transactional strategy was to change the form of the deal to limit
liability. Instead of assuming all liability through a merger, many trans-
actions were done through asset acquisitions. The common law rule in
most states is that a purchaser of assets does not acquire liabilities of the
previous asset owner, unless one of the following four exceptions apply:
(1) the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to avoid liability; (2) the trans-
action amounts to a de facto merger or consolidation; (3) the purchaser
agrees to assume the liabilities, or (4) the purchaser is a mere continua-
tion of the seller.
From the beginning, courts have responded to this approach by
fashioning a federal.common law rule that the legislative purpose of the
Superfund law is to make those with the closest connection to the haz-
ardous substances pay, rather than the public, for the cleanup. Some
courts even read the broad liability classification in section 107(a) of
Superfund to implicitly include asset purchasers.1 8' However, other
courts were troubled by this abrupt disturbance of well-established law.
Absent merger, consolidation, fraud, or express assumption, the "mere
continuation" exception to nonliability requires identity of shareholders
or ownership before and after the transaction. These competing needs
have led to the active consideration of a fifth exception which has gained
acceptance in some states in the area of product liability, the "substantial
continuity" test. Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit adopted this rule for Superfund cases in B.F. Goodrich v.
Betkoski. 182 Under this test, if the company acquiring substantially all of
the assets appears to intend to carry on the prior company's business and
gain any benefit from that continuation, it will be held to be the succes-
sor to the former company owning and operating the assets, and to its
environmental liabilities.1 83 This determination is a flexible and discre-
tionary evaluation of several factors, including, but not limited to, any
one of the following: continuity of employees, management, or stock
ownership; use of the name of the prior company or its products; the
selling corporation's existence after the sale; and assumption of liabili-
181. See Anspech Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
182. 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996).
183. See id. at 519.
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ties by the acquirer t184
The potential adoption of this exception in other circuits is forcing
a rethinking of previous corporate transaction strategies. Because com-
panies fear the exception will spread, it is likely that deals will no longer
be structured as asset purchases solely to insulate the purchaser from
environmental liability. Instead, other mechanisms will be used to pro-
vide a future source of payment, or the liabilities will simply be evalu-
ated as part of the deal and accepted by the purchaser. Such negotiation
and acceptance places the spotlight on quantifying the risks and arrang-
ing for payment or corrective remediation by the seller.
D. Identification and Quantification of Environmental Risks
There has been a great deal of effort made toward standardizing a
methodology for risk identification. Terms such as a "Phase I" or "Phase
II investigation," which used to be highly idiosyncratic in methodology,
content, and cost are increasingly defined by standards set by organiza-
tions such as the American Society for Testing and Materials.' 85
Typically, a Phase I review focuses on a particular property or
properties and includes a "site walkthrough" by an environmental engi-
neer, scientist, or lawyer; interviews with current personnel responsible
for managing environmental compliance and liabilities; and review of
government records and environmental databases for information per-
taining to the company or property.' 8 6 In addition to looking for visible
traces of spills and the care taken in handling materials at the plants,
compliance records and documentary evidence of the relationship with
regulators may be reviewed. The presence of routine environmental
management and compliance systems such as the International Stan-
dards Organization 14000 standards-implemented in the United States
in cooperation with the American National Standards Institute-may be
used to reduce the need for a detailed audit, if good records are main-
tained under these systems.
Where compliance problems are noted in Phase I, typically a more
intense review of compliance information, including direct inquiries to
regulatory officials, will be conducted. Where evidence of contamina-
tion is not matched with clear records of adequate cleanup, due diligence
184. Compare B.F. Goodrich, 99 F.3d at 519-20 with United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed
Co., 980 F.2d 478, 486-90 (8th Cir. 1992).
185. See AMERICAN SOC'Y FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS, E 1527-94, STANDARD PRACTICE
FOR PHASE I ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT (National Soc'y of Envtl. Consultants No.
95170) [hereinafter E 1527-94]; AMERICAN Soc'Y FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS, E 1528-93,
STANDARD PRACTICE FOR TRANSACTION SCREEN PROCESS (National Soc'y of Envtl. Consultants
No. 95502).
186. See E 1527-94, supra note 185, §§ 6-10.
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will often include sampling and testing to independently determine the
scope of contamination and potential risks. As of yet, there are no rou-
tine systems for these "follow-on" investigations. In these cases, it is
essential that the due diligence team have access to an experienced envi-
ronmental lawyer.
The quantification of identified risks involves a balancing of views.
For example, the technical or engineering review may be influenced by
the prospect of a highly lucrative engagement to manage the problem
after acquisition. This may result in a review which understates the
potential technical cost, while qualifying the opinion to avoid profes-
sional liability.
Because a potential for serious problems exists which may call for
reliance on highly qualified judgment calls, the client must be very com-
fortable with the quality of the expertise being relied on. The basis for
this comfort level may be very individualized, changing from deal to
deal. Understanding the need for client confidence is crucial. Such con-
fidence cannot exist unless the lawyer demonstrates an ability to offer
approaches for managing the identified liabilities. As crucial as the need
for client confidence is the need to make the client aware that he or she,
not the lawyer or technical consultant, may be assuming a significant
risk.
E. Managing Risks Before and After the Acquisition
The best method for dealing with identified environmental
problems is also the most difficult to manage in a transactional setting.
Requiring the seller to cure all significant environmental problems
seems to be the most prudent approach, and it can certainly work for
many problems. Sellers will often propose to limit their responsibilities
to correcting these "housekeeping- type" matters. Such matters gener-
ally relate to ongoing regulatory compliance. Of course, the more sig-
nificant problems are those which have developed over time, usually
because of an unwillingness to address the cost of corrective action.
The value of an indemnity-a promise to pay for the correction of
any future problems or settlement of claims-from the seller relates
directly to the availability of the assets backing the promise at the time
the claim may be asserted. Indemnities work best for short-term
problems, such as claims which have already been asserted and are in
litigation or negotiation. Problems which have been identified in due
diligence, but have not yet been asserted as claims or demands, are
problems which may ripen into claims after the sale proceeds have been
distributed and dispersed beyond any hope of reaching them to satisfy
indemnity obligations. Indemnities may also lead to stalling tactics and
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imperfect solutions designed to delay any serious expense until the
indemnitor is gone or judgment-proof. Another option is to form an
escrow. Escrows are a means of assuring funding of a corrective action
program from the seller's assets. Seller usually restricts the duration and
size of escrows. Unless the actions to be taken, and their likely costs,
are clearly understood and expressed, an escrow will invite litigation
that achieves none of the escrow's purposes, upsets the client, and
enriches the new counsel engaged to handle the litigation. It is rare for a
company to invite the counsel who handled the acquisition to handle
litigation over the terms unless the terms are very clear and the seller is
simply welching on the deal with no good defense. Long-term escrows,
when they occur, invite litigation no matter how well constructed, sim-
ply because environmental standards change over time and the parties
tend to forget the specific tasks of the contract in favor of a general
sense of who is responsible for such matters.
Technically, insurance was not a practical option, because the
application costs funded a second tier of due diligence by the proposed
carrier, premiums were very high, and any contingencies were clearly
and explicitly resolved against coverage. Devices such as coverage only
for claims made during the policy term defeated coverage, because envi-
ronmental claims often take so long to mature that insurers had plenty of
time to raise premiums or terminate the policy. Recently, this trend has
begun to change. As insurers have developed enough experience to
assess liabilities more efficiently and to offer policies which effectively
spread out the cashflow of a claim over the period of its potential asser-
tion, with some adjustments for changes in risk over time. This is a
highly specialized area, in which the unaware customer can spend a
great deal of money for little or no protection.
F. Financing Concerns
For years, deals with outside or third-party financing were virtually
impossible if there was even a trace of an environmental problem.
Much of this was traceable to one case, United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp."'87 In Fleet Factors, the Court of Appeals declared in dictum that
a lender could be held liable under Superfund for the cost of cleaning up
the defunct borrower's property on the theory that the lender's financial
relationship gave it the capacity to control the operations of the borrower
and prevent the contamination.' 88 The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") later developed a Superfund regulation providing that
lender's would not be liable if they exercised due care not to cause or
187. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
188. See id. at 1156-59.
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contribute to pollution, held no equity interest in the borrower, and
offered to sell the foreclosed contaminated property to any bona fide
purchaser who offered real value for the property.189 This policy was
overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals in Kelley v. EPA, 9 ° on the
grounds that the Superfund law did not authorize the EPA to redefine the
classes of liable persons. However, legislative solutions continue to be
pursued. For example, 1995's Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act con-
tained an amendment to Superfund's liability provisions modeled on the
EPA policy. t9' As lender protections have grown, lender's concern
about environmental problems has diminished to more proportional con-
cerns about the availability and value of contaminated collateral
property.
G. Innovative Approaches to Environmental Risk Management
Policies have evolved to help businesses deal with environmental
laws. These policies offer the opportunity to identify sites which have
been unfairly stigmatized by low to moderate contamination or high
contamination but little risk of harm-for example, sites where ground-
water contamination cannot be cleaned at any reasonable cost, but the
groundwater is not used, or plants with contaminated soil in remote
industrial areas. New programs allow changes to remediation standards
to reflect the low risk. However, where cleanup costs are reasonable,
such modifications remain unlikely.
Sites which are dedicated to industrial use through deed restrictions
may also be eligible for reduced cleanup standards reflecting the fact
that sensitive populations such as children are much less likely to be
exposed. These programs can limit a purchaser's future liability in
many states.
The EPA has implemented several changes to its Superfund pro-
gram to aid in the redevelopment of "brownfields." The changes include
policies removing cleaned sites from the list of Superfund sites, the
"National Priorities List;" discouraging claims against owners of "inno-
cent" properties affected by migration of contaminated groundwater; and
promoting settlements at fair cost to de minimis parties. The EPA will
also negotiate settlements with persons intending to buy contaminated
Superfund sites and release the purchasers from liability for all past con-
tamination. Some state programs will provide even broader release from
environmental liability to purchasers who clean up, or arrange for the
seller to clean up, truly harmful conditions. Such releases must be care-
189. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(2).
190. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
191. The Act was vetoed by President Clinton in Dec. 1995.
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fully coordinated, because each release is limited to the jurisdiction and
statutory authority of the releasing agency.
Tax policies also must be carefully reviewed and considered. The
Internal Revenue Service has recently allowed the expensing of certain
cleanup costs, thereby changing the impact of such costs on the bottom
line. However, there are eligibility requirements for this treatment,
largely based on the existence of a benefit to an asset resulting from the
cleanup. Opponents argue that contaminated real property is not truly
improved in value or is not improved dollar for dollar by a cleanup.
This issue is still being discussed and argued with in the government.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings also need to
be a part of any due diligence review. A purchaser may well be required
to incorporate the seller's public statements on its environmental liabili-
ties unless reasons are provided for the changes. Increasing SEC review
in this area makes such considerations a necessary part of due diligence.
H. Conclusion
In conclusion, new opportunities exist for the successful acquisition
of corporations with environmental problems. Most of these opportuni-
ties lie with companies whose assets are only moderately contaminated
and whose operating deficiencies can be addressed with the cooperation
and forebearance of the regulators. Substantial legal experience and
judgment are needed to assess an acquisition of this type and to deter-
mine whether the proper conditions are present for a mutually advanta-
geous transaction. The tools for collecting the relevant information for
such an assessment are increasingly available, but the knowledge and
experience to use that information are not yet prevalent.
IV. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS
Corporate mergers and acquisitions give rise to a host of challeng-
ing labor and employment issues with respect to the liability of the suc-
cessor entity for actions and agreements of the predecessor entity. A
fundamental conflict exists between the rights of buyers and sellers of a
company to conduct business transactions without restriction and the
rights of employees of the predecessor entity to enjoy stable employ-
ment conditions. This tension has resulted in the expansion of the
buyer's duties to the seller's employees in certain circumstances. The
purpose of this section is to highlight three areas of potential labor and
employment liabilities that arise from the transfer of ownership of a
company.
First, this section will address the successor corporation's notice
obligations under the Worker Adjustment and Retaining Notification
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Act ("WARN").1 92 Next, this section will address the "successorship
doctrine," a federal common law creation that imputes various liabilities
and responsibilities of the predecessor entity onto the successor entity.
Courts have utilized the successorship doctrine to impute labor obliga-
tions under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 193 as well as
under the federal anti-discrimination statutes. This section will highlight
the principal duties that have been imputed to the successor corporation
under the NLRA and the federal anti-discrimination statutes. Finally,
this section will address the successor entity's ability to enforce individ-
ual employment contracts entered into by the predecessor and its
employees.
A. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act-The Notice
Requirement
WARN requires business enterprises employing a minimum of 100
employees to provide sixty days written notice of a planned plant clos-
ing, mass layoff, or an actual employment termination by sale to a pur-
chaser.194 An employer who violates the Act is liable to each employee
who suffers a job loss due to the violation.1 95 Penalties may include
back pay, benefits, and medical insurance premiums that would have
been paid but for the plant closing, mass layoff, or employment termina-
tion. 196 Penalties are assessed for each day of the violation period, up to
a maximum of 60 days.' 97
192. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
194. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (1994). A "plant closing" is a permanent or temporary shutdown
of a single employment site that causes an "employment loss" for 50 or more employees during a
30-day period. See id. § 2101(a)(2). A "mass layoff" is any other "employment loss" during a 30-
day period for either 50 to 499 full-time employees, if the number laid off equals 33 percent of the
work force or 500 full-time employees. See id. § 2101(a)(3). "Employment loss" is defined as
"(A) an employment termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or
retirement, (B) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a reduction in hours of work of more than 50
percent during each month of any 6 month period." Id. § 2101(a)(6). The Department of Labor
explained in its regulations under the Act that the word "termination" was "to have [its] common
sense meaning[ ]," that is, that a termination is a "permanent cessation of the employment
relationship." Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,047
(1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 639) (proposed Apr. 20, 1989).
The meaning of "employment loss" that triggers WARN liability has been the subject of
litigation. For a discussion of what constitutes an "employment loss" under WARN, see generally
International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators v.
Compact Video Serv., Inc., 50 F.3d 1464, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
196. See id. § 2104(a)(1).
197. See id. § 2104(a)(1)(B).
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1. SALES EXEMPTION
Section 2101(b)(1) has two functions. First, it states that a sale of a
business does not trigger the WARN's notice requirement. 198 Thus, sec-
tion 2101(b) provides a "sales" exemption to the notice requirement.
Second, section 2101(b)(1) also provides the division of liability
between the buyer and seller in a sale or business transaction in the
event that the sale triggers WARN obligations independent of the sale of
the business.' 99
Section 2101(b)(1) codifies the comments to WARN, which recog-
nized that WARN does not require employers to provide notice to its
employees of a sale of a business, absent any other employment modifi-
cations, such as a mass layoff, plant closing, or real employment termi-
nation. 20 ' This exemption is rooted in the concept that only real, rather
than technical, employment losses, should be covered under WARN.2 °'
Nevertheless, the statute does not explain which types of business trans-
actions are exempted from WARN notification under this exemption.20 2
198. See International Alliance, 50 F.3d at 1467 (noting that sale of a business alone does not
trigger WARN liability and that, although a technical termination of the seller's employees may
be deemed to have occurred when a sale becomes effective, WARN notice is only required where
the employees, in fact, experience a covered employment loss); see also Headrick v. Rockwell
Int'l. Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that a sale is not a WARN event and that
"the obligation to warn employees in the event of a closure or mass layoff skips from seller to
buyer, never triggered by the sale").
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a reduction in pay and benefits is not an
"employment loss" subject to WARN notification requirements. See International Alliance, 50
F.3d at 1468 (rejecting union's argument that a pay and benefits cut is a "loss" that affects one's
employment, and thus, constitutes an "employment loss"). Although a sale alone may not trigger
liability, an employment loss due to a sale gives rise to WARN liability, if the employment loss is
one covered under the statute.
199. One case held that the provision dividing responsibility for notice obligations under
WARN does not apply in merger situations. See Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores,
Inc., 790 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (E.D. La. 1992) (joint and several liability applied to buyer and
seller for failure to notify employees of department store's closing because section 2101(b) only
applies to sales situations), aff'd in relevant part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1275
(5th Cir. 1994).
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b)(1) (1994); see also Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,052 (1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 639) (proposed
Apr. 20, 1989).
201. See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,052; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b) ("[A]ny person who is an
employee of the seller.., as of the effective date of the sale shall be considered an employee of
the purchaser immediately after the effective date of the sale."). Section 2101(b) explicitly
extends the employment relationship beyond the employee and the former employer/predecessor
company. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.6 (1996) ("Although a technical termination of the seller's
employees may be deemed to have occurred when a sale becomes effective, WARN notice is only
required where the employees, in fact, experience a covered employment loss."). The regulations
explain, however, that this only extends WARN rights. See id.
202. See Ethan Lipsig & Keith R. Fentonmiller, A WARN Act Road Map, 16 LAB. LAW. 273,
300 (1996) [hereinafter Lipsig & Fentonmiller, Road Map]. But see International Alliance, 50
F.3d at 1470 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (drawing distinction between sale of a business and sale of
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For example, there is no clear explanation whether the sales exemption
covers mergers, stock sales, or asset sales. If the exemption did apply,
none of those types of business acquisitions would trigger either the
buyer or the seller to notify the buyer's workforce of the business
transaction.
In addition to clearly explaining that a sale of a business does not
trigger potential WARN liability, the sale of business exemption pro-
vides the division of notice obligations between the predecessor and suc-
cessor corporations in situations covered under WARN.2" 3 The statute
draws the line of notice obligations at the date of the sale of the prede-
cessor business.2"4 Section 2101(b) states that until and including the
date of sale, the predecessor corporation is responsible for providing
notice of any plant closing or mass layoff that occurs or is to occur, and
is financially responsible for any penalties acquired due to its failure to
provide the required notice.2 °5 Section 2101(b) further explains that
after the date of sale, the buyer becomes responsible for providing notice
of any plant closing or layoff, and is financially responsible for any pen-
alties assessed for its failure to give the required notice.2 °6 Thus, in the
case of the sale of part or all of the business, section 2101(b)(1) defines
who the "employer" is for purposes of WARN notification obligations.
Despite the clear division of responsibility between buyer and
the assets of the business). The dissent argued that, although the former does not implicate
WARN notification requirements because of the statutory exemption, the latter does because the
sale of assets does not usually involve a transfer of employees. See id. at 1470 (noting four
exceptions where sale of assets would transfer seller's liability). Under the general rule that the
seller retains all liabilities in an asset sale, the dissent argued that the employment loss would be
"real" and not technical. See id.
203. For a description of the types of events that trigger WARN notification responsibility, see
supra note 194, which defines "mass layoff," "plant closing," and employment termination.
204. Pursuant to the authority granted by Congress, the Department of Labor provided
interpretive guidance for section 2101(b)(l). The regulation states:
(c) In the case of the sale of part or all of a business, section 2(b)(1) of WARN
defines who the "employer" is. The seller is responsible for providing notice of any
plant closing or mass layoff which takes place up to and including the effective date
(time) of the sale, and the buyer is responsible for providing notice of any plant
closing or mass layoff that takes place thereafter. Affected employees are always
entitled to notice; at all times the employer is responsible for providing notice.
(1) If the seller is made aware of any definite plans on the part of the buyer to
carry out a plant closing or mass layoff within 60 days of purchase, the seller may
give notice to affected employees as an agent of the buyer, if so empowered. If the
seller does not give notice, the buyer is, nevertheless, responsible to give notice. If
the seller gives notice as the buyer's agent, the responsibility for notice still remains
with the buyer.
29 C.F.R. § 639.4(c) (1996).
205. See Jerome B. Kairr & Dennis A. Lalli, Problems Relating to Layoffs, Plant Closure, and
Sales Transactions, in HANDLING CORPORATION EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS 1991, at 465, 475-76
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 410, 1991).
206. See id.
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seller, the statute is ambiguous on two points. First, the division of
notice responsibilities in section 2101(b)(1) does not account for busi-
ness transactions other than a traditional "sale of a business." For exam-
ple, at least one case held that the division of notification responsibilities
in section 2101(b)(1) did not apply to the buyer in an asset sale, because
the buyer was never the "employer" of the predecessor's employees
under the statute.2 °7 In that case, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union v. CIT Group/Capital Equipment Financing, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held
that the duty to notify employees of a plant closing pursuant to an asset
sale never transfers to the buyer, even if the plant closing occurs after
the sale. 2 8
The second ambiguity found in section 2101(b)(1) relates to the
fact that neither the statute nor the legislative history provides the mean-
ing of the phrase "up to and including the effective date of sale." As
noted, section 2101(b)(1) requires sellers to give notice of any impend-
ing mass layoffs or closings that occur "up to and including the effective
date of sale."209 Commentators have provided two interpretations of the
meaning of this phrase. The first interpretation is that employees work-
ing for the seller through the close of business immediately prior to the
actual effective date, who are terminated as a result of the sale, will be
treated as employed by the buyer.210 This approach, the "functional"
interpretation, relieves sellers of any WARN responsibilities that stem
from the sale, despite the fact that it is the seller that is terminating the
employee prior to the actual effective date of the sale. 21' The second
interpretation is that only employees who technically remain employed
by the buyer after the date of the sale, and who are subsequently termi-
nated as a result of the sale, are treated as employed by the buyer.21 2
207. See Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. CIT Group/Capital Equip. Fin., Inc.,
898 F. Supp. 451, 456 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
208. See id. at 455-57. The court rejected both of the plaintiffs' arguments as to why the
buyers should constitute the plaintiffs' employers following the asset purchase. First, the plaintiffs
argued that because the defendant created the situation which resulted in the termination of the
employment, they should be the plaintiffs' employers as a matter of law. See id. at 455.
Following other precedent, the court emphasized that the employer is not the entity that ordered
the shutdown, but instead is the entity that hired, fired, supervised, and paid the employees. See
id. Next, the plaintiffs argued that section 2101(b)(1) mandated that the sellers' employees
automatically became the buyer's responsibility at the time of the sale. See id. at 456. Relying on
the language and purpose of § 2101(b)(1), the court rejected the plaintiffs' reading of section
2101(b)(1) and held that the notice provision imputes notice obligations for a covered employment
loss upon buyers only when the sale entails the transfer of a company's total business and its
employees. See id. at 457.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b)(l) (1994).
210. See Lipsig & Fentonmiller, Road Map, supra note 202, at 301.
211. See id.
212. See id.
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This approach, the "formalistic" approach, relies on the literal language
of the statute and construes the phrase the "effective date of the sale" to
mean "the instant the sale occurs.12 13 In light of the serious conse-
quences that attach to both interpretations, companies should be wary of
the statute's ambiguity on this issue.
B. Successorship Doctrine and Labor-Related Liabilities
Through a series of decisions over the past thirty years, the
Supreme Court created the successorship doctrine, which effectively
transfers certain labor-related obligations from the seller of a company
to the buyer if the employees are represented by a union.214 Successor-
ship liability can involve an assortment of obligations, including the
duty to bargain with the labor union representing the predecessor's
employees,21 5 the duty to arbitrate under the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement, 216 the duty to remedy the predecessor's unfair
labor practices, 217 and the duty to remedy the predecessor's violations of
the federal anti-discrimination laws. In light of these potential liabilities,
the successorship doctrine has serious implications for companies nego-
tiating mergers or sales of businesses. This section highlights the poten-
tial areas of successorship liability that corporate attorneys should
consider prior to evaluating the worth of a particular business.
1. DETERMINING SUCCESSORSHIP
The threshold inquiry in determining whether a court will saddle
buyer of a company with the predecessor company's labor-related liabil-
ities is whether the buyer falls within the definition of a "successor"
under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). The Supreme Court
has explained that the question of whether a buyer qualifies as a succes-
sor is a question that must be answered on a case-by-case basis.218 The
213. See id.
214. If the employees are not members of the union, the successorship doctrine does not apply.
Instead, the traditional rules of at-will employment are applicable.
215. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987); NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
216. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
217. See Golden State Bottling Co. V. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); M&J Supply Co., 300
N.L.R.B. 444 (1990).
218. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43 (noting that determination should be based on totality of
circumstances of a given situation); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417
U.S. 249, 262-63, 263 n.8 (1974). Fall River provides an example of the application of the totality
of circumstances approach. In Fall River, the court found that the buyer was a successor for
purposes of determining whether it was required to bargain with the union that represented the
predecessor's former employees. See Fall River, 482. U.S. at 44-46. The Court found the
following factors to be persuasive evidence of successorship: (1) the buyer acquired most of the
predecessor's real property, machinery, equipment, inventory, and materials; (2) the buyer did not
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Supreme Court has continuously focused its determination of successor-
ship on whether there is a "substantial continuity" between the enter-
prises. 2 t9 Under the "substantial continuity" approach, the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") must examine a number of factors,
including the following: (1) whether the business of both employers is
essentially the same; (2) whether the employees of the new company are
doing the same jobs in the same working conditions under the same
supervisors; and (3) whether the new entity has the same production
process, produces the same products, and has the same customers.2
The most important factor is the continuity of the work force. 2
In conducting its analysis, the Court has instructed the NLRB to
determine whether "substantial continuity" exists from the employees'
perspective.222 Thus, the NLRB must ascertain whether the employees
believed their jobs were altered by the business transaction.
The Court has recognized that the purchaser is under no obligation
to hire the predecessor's employees. 223  Thus, the purchaser has some
degree of control over whether it becomes a successor, provided that it
does not refuse to hire the predecessor's employees solely to avoid suc-
cessorship status.224 Nevertheless, if the successor plans to hire a sub-
stantial part of its predecessor's workforce, it should be ready to assume
the obligations that the successorship doctrine imposes.
introduce a new product line; (3) employees' jobs did not change when buyer purchased seller;
and (4) the record demonstrated that the buyer acquired the seller with the express purpose of
utilizing the seller's work force. See id. at 44. The buyer pointed to the following factors and
argued that it was not a successor of the seller: (1) the buyer purchased the seller's assets on the
open market, therefore there were no prior dealings between the two entities; and (2) there was a
seven-month hiatus between the end of the predecessor's and the commencement of the buyer's
operation. See id. at 44 n.10, 45. The Court rejected both of these arguments. See id.
Specifically, the Court explained that a hiatus between operations is only one factor in the
substantial continuity analysis, and that the other factors pointed toward a finding of successor
status. See id. at 45-46.
219. See, e.g., Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43-46 (applying "substantial continuity" test to
determine if buyer was successor); Burns, 406 U.S. at 280.
220. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43.
221. See id.; Nazareth Reg'l High Sch. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The key
factor in determining whether an employer succeeds to an obligation to bargain with the
incumbent union is the substantial continuity in the identity of the work force.").
222. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43. The emphasis on the employees' perspective furthers the
policy of industrial peace, which underlies the NLRA. See id.
223. See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 261.
224. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40-41 ("[T]o a substantial extent, the applicability of Burns
rests in the hands of the successor."). If an employer refuses to hire an employee because of the
employee's union membership, the employer's actions constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA. See B. Glenn George, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 277, 290-91 (1988) [hereinafter George, Successorship]. Remedies for such discriminatory
actions include reinstatement with backpay. See id. at 291.
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2. LABOR-RELATED DUTIES
a. The Duty to Arbitrate
Assuming that a buyer qualifies as a successor, it may have a duty
to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the seller's employees under
the seller's unexpired collective bargaining agreement. For example, if
the predecessor corporation no longer exists and the buyer completes a
"wholesale transfer" of the predecessor's employees, an arbitrator may
find that the successor has a duty to arbitrate disputes arising under the
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 225 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has limited the successor's duty to arbitrate under the
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 226 First, the duty to arbi-
trate the issue of whether the buyer is obligated to abide by a successors
and assigns clause in the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement
does not extend to the buyer if the predecessor company remains a via-
ble corporate entity.227 Thus, the Court created the possibility that pred-
ecessors may be held liable for a breach of a successors and assigns
clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and narrowed the possibility
225. These facts were presented to the Supreme Court in its first successorship case, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). Wiley involved the merger of a small
publishing company with 40 union employees, into John Wiley & Sons, a company with 300
employees. See id. at 545. Wiley retained all of the employees from the original publishing
company. See id. at 545-46. The predecessor corporation had negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement with the employee's union, District 65, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
("District 65"). See id. at 544. After the merger, District 65 claimed that it continued to represent
the employees and demanded various employee rights. See id. at 545. Wiley refused to recognize
District 65's right to arbitrate claims under the earlier collective bargaining agreement. See id. at
545. The Supreme Court held that District 65 had a right to arbitrate claims with the successor
company under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 550-51. The Court
reasoned that the duty to arbitrate under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement was
transferred to Wiley because there was "substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise." Id. at 551.
226. See George, Successorship, supra note 224 at 278-79 (noting that duty to arbitrate extent
of obligations occurs only in limited and unusual circumstances).
227. See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257-58. In Howard Johnson, the union brought a
cause of action under § 301 of the NLRA seeking to compel Howard Johnson to arbitrate the
extent of its obligation to honor the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 252-
53. Howard Johnson involved an asset purchase arrangement, whereby Howard Johnson
purchased a motor lodge through a lease arrangement and expressly refused to assume any labor
obligations of the seller. See id. at 251-52. The collective bargaining agreement, however,
contained a successorship clause binding the predecessors' successors and assigns to the terms of
the agreement. See id. at 251.
The Court held that Howard Johnson was not a successor employer required to arbitrate
under its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 256-57. The Court
distinguished its decision in Wiley on two points. First, less than a majority of the predecessor's
employees were hired by Howard Johnson. See id. at 259. Second, Wiley involved a merger in
which the original employer disappeared after the merger, while Howard Johnson involved a
partial sale of assets in which the original employer remained a viable corporate entity. See id. at
257-58.
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of recovery against the successor for the breach of the agreement. Sec-
ond, the Court has made it clear that a buyer cannot be bound by the
substantive provisions of a collective bargaining agreement previously
negotiated by a seller, the buyer did not agree to its terms or expressly
assume its obligations.228 Thus, the NLRB has no power to bind the
successor to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement unless
the successor voluntarily assumes the contract.
b. The Duty to Bargain
In NLRB v. Burns International Services, Inc., the Court held that if
the buyer is deemed a successor, it has a duty to negotiate with the union
representative of the former employees of the predecessor corpora-
tion.229 The factor that triggers the successor's bargaining obligations is
the composition of the successor's work force. The duty to bargain with
228. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 284 (1972). In Bums, Burns
replaced Wackenhut as Lockheed Aircraft's security firm. See id. at 274. Unlike the factual
scenario presented in Wiley, no contractual relationship existed between Wackenhut and Bums,
and no merger or sale of assets occurred. See id. The Court held that Bums was not bound by the
substantive provisions of a collective bargaining agreement because such an imposition would
chill corporate transactions. See id. at 287-88.
229. See id. at 281. The Supreme Court decided two cases with respect to the successor's duty
to bargain with the predecessor's employees' union. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 27; Bums, 406
U.S. at 272. In Bums, the predecessor's employees were represented by the United Plant Guard
Workers of America ("UPGW") under a collective bargaining agreement. See Burns, 406 U.S. at
274. The change of ownership occurred during a certification period, a time in which the union's
majority status is irrebuttable. See id. at 274-75. When Burns gained control, however, it failed to
recognize UPGW as the representative union of the predecessor's workers. See id. at 274. The
Court held that the successor's rejection of UPGW was improper and explained that "where the
bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer
are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent there is little basis for faulting the
[NLRB's] ... ordering the employer to bargain with the incumbent union." Id. at 281. In 1987,
the Supreme Court returned to the question of the duty to bargain with the predecessor's union in
Fall River. In Fall River, seven months after the predecessor ceased operations due to financial
difficulties, Fall River purchased the equipment and inventory of the predecessor at a creditor's
auction. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 32. In September 1982, Fall River began operating out of its
predecessor's former facilities. See id. at 32. Fall River's initial hiring goal was to attain one full
shift of workers. See id. at 33. After it met this initial goal, the company planned to expand to
two shifts, if expansion was feasible. See id. By mid-January 1983, it had hired one shift of
workers and, by mid-April 1983, it had hired two full shifts. See id. Meanwhile, in October 1982,
the union requested that Fall River recognize it as the bargaining agent for those current
employees that were once the predecessor's employees. See id. at 33. When Fall River refused
the union's demand, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge. See id. at 34. After hearing
the case, the administrative law judge held that Fall River was a successor and that its duty to
bargain arose in mid-January when it "attained a representative complement" of its predecessor's
employees. See id. at 34. The NLRB affirmed. See id. at 35.
The Supreme Court agreed with the administrative law judge and the NLRB holding that: (1)
the successor's duty to bargain is not limited to situations where the predecessor's union was
recently certified; (2) Fall River was a successor; and (3) the duty to bargain arises when a
substantial and "representative complement" of employees is attained. See id. at 40, 46, 52.
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the predecessor's union representative arises when the majority of the
employees hired by the new employer were employees of the seller.23°
The Court also addressed the issue of when the buyer's work force
should be measured to determine if a majority of its work force is
derived from the predecessor entity. In Fall River, the Court approved
the test utilized by the NLRB, which required that the determination be
made when the successor attained "a substantial and representative com-
plement" of employees.231 Under this approach, the NLRB examines a
number of factors, including the following: (1) whether the job classifi-
cations designated for the operation were filled or substantially filled;
(2) whether the operation was in normal or substantially normal produc-
tion; (3) the size of the staff on the date of measurement; (4) the time
expected to elapse before a substantially larger complement would be at
work; and (5) the relative certainty -of the employer's expected
expansion.232
The successor's duty to bargain at the "substantial and representa-
tive complement" date is triggered only when the union has made a bar-
gaining demand.233 Under this rule, if a union makes a premature
demand that the employer rejects, the demand remains in place until the
moment when the employer reaches its "substantial and representative
complement" status.
234
Until the duty to bargain is triggered, the Court has made it clear
that the buyer is free to alter the terms of employment of its newly
acquired employees.235 Thus, in a certain sense, the duty to bargain is a
230. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 46; Bums, 406 U.S. at 278-79. The requirement of majority
status rests on the underlying principle embodied in the NLRA-the democratic principle of
majority rule. See George, supra note 224, at 298. The rule that the successor has a duty to
bargain with the union repesenting predecessor's employees'stems from the principle that a union
elected for more than one year has a rebuttable presumption of majority status that does not cease
at the transfer of the ownership of a business. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 37. Nevertheless, the
employer can overcome this presumption if it has objective and reasonable bases for a good faith
doubt about the union's continuing majority support. See id. at 40 n.8.
231. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 49.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 52.
234. See id. This is referred to as the "continuing demand" rule. Id.; see also George,
Successorship, supra note 224, at 296. Professor George explains that under the continuing
demand rule, the employer can comply with its duty to bargain once it has determined that the
requisite complement has been reached. To comply, the employer should determine whether the
union has made a demand for bargaining. See id. at 296-97. If so, the duty is triggered. See id.;
Fall River, 482 U.S. at 52-53.
235. See George, Successorship, supra note 224, at 295; see also Leslie Braginsky, Comment,
How Changes in Employer Identity Affect Employment Continuity: A Comparison of the United
States and the United Kingdom, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 231, 238 (1995) [hereinafter Braginsky,
Employer Identity] (noting that the successor employer "has a window of opportunity within
which to change the conditions of employment").
1997]
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much more limited constraint on the transfer of capital than the duty to
arbitrate. Because the duty to bargain depends on whether the new
employer hires the requisite amount of employees, the employer can
avoid the duty to bargain by not hiring the predecessor's employees.
Nevertheless, the employer is required to consult with the predecessor
employee's union representative if it is clear that the successor is going
to retain all of the employees in the bargaining unit.
236
c. Liability for Predecessor's Unfair Labor Practices
In Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,237 the Supreme Court held
that a successor corporation may be liable for its predecessor corpora-
tion's unfair labor practices.238 According to the Court's decision in
Golden State, a purchaser could be liable as a successor for the back pay
due to the employee if it acquired the predecessor with full knowledge
of a prior NLRB order requiring reinstatement and back pay. It is irrele-
vant for purposes of this rule that the successor did not commit any
unfair labor practices.239
As a result of the Court's decision in Golden State, the NLRB has
required successor corporations to take various steps to remedy the pred-
ecessor's unfair labor practices. Examples include, but are not limited
to, requiring the successor company to: (1) offer immediate reinstate-
ment to employees without regard to any hardship such a requirement
might place on the employer; (2) pay back pay from the date of the
discharge by the predecessor to the date of reinstatement; (3) post cease
and desist notices barring the predecessors' unlawful interrogations of
pro-union employers; and (4) accord recognition to their predecessor's
union to remedy the predecessor's previous unlawful withdrawals of
recognition.24 o
d. Liability for Civil Rights Violations of Predecessor Entity
Several courts and the NLRB have extended the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Golden State to impose liability upon a successor corpora-
tion for the predecessor's discriminatory practices under various federal
236. See Braginsky, Employer Identity, supra note 235, at 238.
237. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
238. See id. at 186-87.
239. See id. at 184-85. The Court applied the successorship doctrine and concluded that it
should not be narrowly construed in a situation where the successor had knowledge of the prior
litigation and NLRB order. See id. at 182 n.5.
240. See William H. DuRoss, III, Increasing the Labor-Related Costs of Business Transfers
and Acquisitions: The Spectre of Per Se Liability for New Owners, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 375, 398-99
(1989).
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antidiscrimination statutes. 241 Thus, successor entities are required to
bear the burden of remedying the predecessor's past actions, if the suc-
cessor employer had notice of the Equal Emplooyment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") charge filed against the predecessor company
prior to the transfer of ownership.
The first case to apply the successorship doctrine to remedy past
violations of the federal antidiscrimination laws was EEOC v. MacMil-
lan Bloedel Containers, Inc. 242 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit developed a test to determine whether the new owner should be
liable for the predecessor's Title VII violation.243 The factors included
the following: (1) whether the successor company had notice of the
charge; (2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief; and (3)
whether there had been a substantial continuity of business
operations.244
No one factor is controlling, thus the reviewing court should look at
each factor and balance the interests of the plaintiff and the national
policy of abhorrence toward employment discrimination against the
interest of the successor company. 245  Nevertheless, without notice of
241. See, e.g., EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974).
242. In MacMillan, the Sixth Circuit applied the successorship doctrine and held that the
successor corporation was required to remedy the predecessor's violation of Title VII. See id. at
1090.
243. See id. at 1089-93.
244. See id. at 1094 (citing Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S.
249, 256-58 (1974)); see also Rojas v. TK Communications Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding successor not liable for predecessor's civil rights violation despite the fact that it had
notice, because predecessor was a viable entity, plaintiff rejected successor's offer of
reinstatement, and plaintiff did not pursue reinstatement claim); EEOC v. G-K-G. Inc., 39 F.3d
740, 748 (7th Cir. 1994) (allowing plaintiff to pursue age discrimination claim against successor
because successor had notice of EEOC charge prior to purchase and there was substantial
continuity of enterprises); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 946 (7th Cir. 1988); Wheeler v.
Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that successorship liability is
appropriate when (1) successor has notice of violation; (2) there was a substantial continuity of
enterprises; (3) predecessor could not provide relief to employee); Bates v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n., 744 F.2d 705, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
The MacMillan court also listed the following factors: (1) whether the buyer uses the same
plant; (2) whether the buyer uses the same or substantially the same work force; (3) whether the
buyer uses the same or substantially the same supervisory personnel; (4) whether the same jobs
exist under the substantially same working conditions; (5) whether the buyer uses the same
machinery, equipment and production methods; and (6) whether the buyer produces the same
product. See MacMillan, 503 U.S. at 1094; see also Brown v. Evening News Ass'n., 473 F. Supp.
1242, 1244-45 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
245. The primary concern in imputing liability under the successorship doctrine is to provide
full relief to the plaintiff. See MacMillan, 503 U.S. at 1092. Courts have reached different
conclusions with respect to whether the requirement of full relief compels non-monetary relief
even if monetary relief may be sought from the predecessor because it remains a viable entity.
Compare Brown, 473 F. Supp. at 1247 (not requiring successor corporation to remedy past
violation with reinstatement, where predecessor could provide both monetary and non-monetary
relief) with Howard v. Penn. Central Transp. Co. 87 F.R.D. 342, 349 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (finding
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the predecessor's violation prior to the business acquisition or merger,
courts have been unwilling to impute liability to the successor
corporation.246
Several courts have followed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Mac-
Millan.24 7 Since MacMillan, courts have applied the successorship doc-
trine and held successor corporations liable for their predecessor's
violations of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.
Successor liabilty in the civil rights context translates into various
obligations, including,but not limited to, the following: the payment of
money damages and attorney's fees for the predecessor's violation of the
federal antidiscrimination laws, immediate reinstatement for employees
improperly terminated by the seller, compliance with injunctions and
consent decrees issued against the seller, and continuance of the seller's
pension and welfare contributions and medical benefits compensation.
In light of the potential remedies available to plaintiffs, a predecessor
should insist that the sales or merger agreement provides for its nonlia-
that successor could be liable to plaintiff because absent its liability, plaintiff could not be
reinstated in the position he would have had absent the discrimination, even though predecessor
could provide different job and monetary relief). In addition, courts are much less willing to
impute liability onto a successor corporation where the predecessor remains a viable entity. See
Rojas, 87 F.3d at 750 (not holding successor liable for predecessor's civil rights violations, where
predecessor operated other viable entities and could supply plaintiff with full relief);
Musikiwamba v. Essi, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that it is improper to
hold successor liable for civil rights violation if predecessor could not provide relief prior to the
transfer of ownership of the business because imposition would impede free flow of capital);
Kolosky v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 585 F. Supp. 746, 750 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing joinder of
successor corporation, but noting that successor corporation should only be liable if predecessor
cannot provide full relief, reinstatement). But see Bates, 744 F.2d at 710-11 (allowing relief
against successor despite existence of predecessor entity, holding that fact that predecessor entity
was still viable was less important because plaintiffs sought class-wide relief).
246. See Chicago Truck Drivers v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 49 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing
notice requirement); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding
that successor was not liable unless the successor knew about a filed or pending discrimination
charge prior to date of purchase); Dominguez v. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant & Miscellaneous
Bartenders Union, Local 64, 674 F.2d 732, 733 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that insufficient evidence
of the successor's knowledge about pending discrimination charge precluded imposition of
liability); Burt v. Ramada Inn, 507 F. Supp. 336, 338 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (holding that new owner
of motel was not liable to former maintenance person for Title VII race discrimination claim
because new owner had no knowledge of EEOC right to sue letter); Howard, 87 F.R.D. at 349
(holding that successor company could be liable to plaintiff for nonmonetary relief to remedy Title
VII and section 1981 discrimination, even though predecessor was in position to provide monetary
relief in light of the fact that predecessor was still an ongoing entity).
247. See, e.g., Bates, 744 F.2d at 710; Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d 221, 224-25
(10th Cir. 1982) (holding successor corporation liable for the predecessor's Title VII violation,
where there was substantial continuity of the business operations, successor had notice of EEOC
complaint and could have provided for nonliability in the sale agreement, and equities balanced in
favor of doctrine's application).
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bility or indemnification for liability incurred as a result of the predeces-
sor's Title VII violation.248 While the existence of a nonliability or
indemnification clause does not relieve the successor from liability
against the discriminatee, it may provide for a cause of action against the
predecessor.249
C. Assignability of Individual Employment Agreements and
Covenants Not to Compete
The issue of whether a successor company may enforce an employ-
ment contract or a covenant not to compete executed by its predecessor
and one of its employees is a matter of state law. Jurisdictions have
resolved the matter by taking various approaches to the question. The
general rule appears to be that a valid covenant not to compete made by
the seller of a business is transferrable to the buyer and, thus, is enforce-
able by a transferee.25° Several cases have adhered to this view where
the business transaction was a merger or stock transfer, rather than an
asset sale.251 Conversely, several jurisdictions have found that cove-
248. See Trujillo, 694 F.2d at 225 (noting that successor could have avoided liabilty by
providing for nonliability or indemnification in sales agreement).
249. See Kolosky, 585 F. Supp. at 748 (finding that sales agreement providing for nonliability
will not shield successor from liability for predecessor's Title VII violation); Brown, 473 F. Supp.
at 1245 n.I (rejecting defendant's argument that nonliability and indemnification clause shields
defendant from successorship liability).
250. For an excellent example of the application of this rule, see A. Fink & Sons, Inc. v.
Goldberg, 139 A. 408, 409-10 (N.J. Ch. 1927); see also Hexacomb Corp. V. GTW Enters., Inc.,
875 F. Supp. 457, 465 (N.D. I11. 1993) (noting that Illinois courts have recognized the
assignability of confidentiality and non-compete agreements) (citing Hamer Holding Group, Inc.
v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907, 917 (Ill.App. Ct. 1990)); Abalene Pest Control Serv., Inc. v. Powell,
176 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 187 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 1959); Norman Ellis Corp. v.
Lippus, 176 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
251. In transactions where the identity of the employing entity is not regarded as having
changed, courts have reasoned that there is no "assignment" of the employment contract for the
employee to contest. See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (finding that a mere change in form of employer's business resulting from a merger
did not cause assignment such that surviving corporation was precluded from enforcing
employment covenants); Nenow v. L.C. Cassidy & Son of Fla., Inc., 141 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1962) (holding that covenant not to compete was assignable where assignee was subsidiary
of the assignor, because "[i]nsofar as [the employee] was concerned, this was an exchange of
stock for assets, the parties remaining the same"); Haldor, Inc. v. Beebe, 164 P.2d 568, 572 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (holding that assignment does not occur where ownership, control, or
management does not change, and that where a technical assignment occurs, but there was no
actual substitution of parties, new entity can enforce contract); cf. Alldredge v. Twenty-Five
Thirty-Two Broadway Corp., 509 S.W.2d 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that covenant not to
compete was not binding upon successor corporation, where contract contained no provision for
assignability and transaction involved sale of business).
A related problem arises when the predecessor/covenantee changes business form. Courts
have allowed the new entity to enforce the covenants entered into by the earlier business entity.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Runfola & Assoc., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ohio 1991) (holding that
covenant not to compete with sole proprietorship was transferrable to corporation transformed
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nants contained in individual employment contracts were not enforcea-
ble by successor entities, relying on the principle that an employment
contract is a personal service contract, which is not assignable. 2
Despite support for this more restrictive approach, courts have
adopted several rationales to permit a successor entity to enforce a
restrictive covenant against a former employee of the predecessor com-
pany. First, even jurisdictions taking the view that personal service con-
tracts are not assignable recognize that an express condition in an
employment contract, providing for assignment by the use of terms like
"assigns" or "successors," allows the successor corporation to enforce an
otherwise unenforceable covenant.253 Florida is an example of a juris-
diction taking this approach. Florida courts follow the general rule that
personal service contracts are not assignable. 254 Nevertheless, in Pino v.
Spanish Broadcasting System of Florida, Inc.,255 a Florida court held
that a covenant not to compete was assignable, provided that the cove-
nantor consented in writing to its assignability.256
Second, at least one Florida court has characterized a covenant not
to compete as a non-traditional personal service contract that was assign-
from sole proprietorship, because, inter alia, change in legal structure of business did not change
business itself); Seligman & Latz of Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Vernillo, 114 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1955) (holding
that corporation that succeeded partnership could enforce employment contracts of partnership's
employees because the fact of incorporation did not affect the employees' obligations to honor
covenants).
252. See, e.g., Smith, Bell & Hauck, Inc. v. Cullins, 183 A2d 528 (Vt. 1962); Sisco v.
Empiregas, Inc., 237 So. 2d 463, 467 (Ala. 1970).
253. See, e.g., Mail-Well Envelope Co. v. Saley, 497 P.2d 364, 368 (Or. 1972) (holding that
clause stating that "the provisions of this contract shall extend to the successors, and assigns of the
Employer" permitted successor's enforcement of restrictive covenant).
254. See Schweiger v. Hoch, 223 So. 2d 557, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) ("Florida is committed
to the general law that contracts for personal services, or those involving a relationship of personal
confidence, are not assignable by either party unless the contract so provides, or unless the other
party consents thereto or ratifies the assignment."); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 161 So.
284, 290 (Fla. 1935).
255. 564 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
256. See id. at 188. The employee entered into an employment contract that contained a
covenant not to compete for a one-year period following the employee's termination of
employment with the covenantee. See id. at 187. The contract also provided that it was
"transferable or assignable by the [employer] and shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the [employer's] successors or assigns." Id. Shortly thereafter, the employer sold its assets to
another company, and, as part of the sale, the employee's contract was assigned to the successor.
See id. The court affirmed the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction to enforce the
non-competition agreement. See id. at 189. First, it recognized that personal service contracts are
assignable by consent of the parties. See id. at 188. Then the court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that Florida's statute allowing parties to enter into restrictive covenants prevented the
plaintiff assignor from enforcing the covenant. See id. The court found that statute did not
expressly prohibit the right to assign personal service contracts containing covenants not to
compete. See id.
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able. In In re Hearing Centers of America, Inc.,257 the court noted that
the employment contracts were not personal service contracts under the
traditional definition, because the contracts contained covenants barring
employees from performing, rather than assigning the performance of a
personal service.25
Third, courts have recognized that a successor may be able to
enforce a restrictive covenant entered into by its predecessor if the
employee's conduct manifested his or her assent to, or ratification of, the
prior assignment of the covenant not to compete. 259 To permit assign-
ment under this principle, however, courts have required proof that the
predecessor assigned the employment contract to its successor and the
employee knew the contract had been assigned. 26 ° Florida adheres to
this position. Under Florida law, however, the employee's continued
employment with the successor does not, in itself, prove that the parties
intended for the original contract to be assigned or that the assignment
was consented to or ratified by the employee. 261 The employer must
prove some additional conduct by the employee that shows his or her
approval of the assignment of the employment contract.2 6 2
V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN MERGER AND ACQUISITION
The acquisition of a business that owns or licenses patents, trade-
marks, copyrights, or trade secrets (the "Business") should always be
preceded by an evaluation of its intellectual property rights, including a
clear understanding of the nature and extent of the intellectual property
rights that will be acquired. Without such an evaluation, the buyer could
overestimate the value of the intellectual property. Moreover, without a
clear understanding of all limitations placed upon the intellectual prop-
erty rights of the Business, the buyer might inadvertently engage in con-
duct that exceeds the scope of the intellectual property rights obtained,
thereby exposing the buyer to unexpected liability.
A buyer should take the following four major steps when acquiring
the Business: (1) evaluate the intellectual property rights of the Busi-
ness through a "due diligence" investigation; (2) correct any defects in
257. 106 B.R. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
258. See id. at 721-22; see also A. Fink & Sons, Inc. v. Goldberg, 139 A. 408, 410 (N.J. Ch.
1927).
259. See, e.g., Green's Dairy, Inc. v. Chilcoat, 89 Pa. D. & C. 351, 353 (York County 1953)
(ratifying assignment of employment contract with noncompete clause); Jack Tratenberg, Inc. v.
Komoroff, 87 Pa. D. & C. 1, 13 (Philadelphia County 1951) (finding that defendant's knowledge
of his employer's incorporation and his failure to leave plaintiff's employ or object constituted
assent to assignment of employment contract).
260. See Schweiger, 223 So. 2d at 558.
261. See id. at 559.
262. See id.
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the intellectual property prior to closing; (3) obtain valid title; and (4)
perfect that title. A party obtaining a security interest in intellectual
property should take similar steps to ensure that it has an accurate esti-
mate of the value of the collateral.263
A. Due Diligence Investigation
Although the due diligence investigation will vary depending on
the circumstances of each proposed transaction, it will generally include
reviewing the following: (1) pertinent documents provided by the Busi-
ness (e.g., application files, licenses, litigation files, and nondisclosure
agreements); (2) certain types of public information (e.g., the records of
U.S. and foreign patent, trademark and copyright offices, and state
records of Uniform Commercial Code financing statements); and (3)
certain specialized information sources (e.g., trademark clearance search
databases). As part of this investigation, the buyer should ask the Busi-
ness to disclose the existence of actual or potential infringement suits,
administrative challenges, and pending litigation concerning the intellec-
tual property of the Business.
During the due diligence review, the buyer should be attuned to
many issues, especially the following: (1) common law (i.e., unregis-
tered) trademarks and the scope of the geographic area in which com-
mon law protection is available for those marks; (2) intellectual property
rights that may have been abandoned (e.g., through non-use of a trade-
mark), or registrations or patents that may have expired or been can-
celed; (3) defects in the record title to the intellectual property rights to
be acquired; (4) "intent-to-use" applications for U.S. or foreign trade-
mark registration; (5) potential threats to the validity or enforceability of
the relevant patents; (6) inventions for which patent applications need to
be filed to avoid losing the possibility of obtaining patent protection; (7)
trade secrets of the Business and whether such are adequately protected
by confidentiality agreements and covenants against competition; (8)
actual or potential litigation; (9) restrictions or expanding the use of the
intellectual property that will be acquired; (10) intellectual property
licenses and their effect, if any, on the transaction; and (11) any encum-
brances (e.g., security interests, collateral assignments and conditional
assignments) on the Business' intellectual property.
B. Correction of Intellectual Property Defects Prior to Acquisition
If time permits, the buyer should attempt to correct any defects
263. For simplicity, this Article only refers to the buyer of the Business. There are additional
issues that a creditor obtaining a security interest in intellectual property collateral should address.
[Vol. 51:719
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found in the intellectual property of the Business before consummating
the transaction. Although it may be possible to correct such defects sub-
sequent to the closing of the transaction, it is more efficient to do so
before the closing. In addition, because titles to patents, trademark
registrations, and copyright registrations are frequently in an affiliate of
the Business, the buyer should require that record title for all such intel-
lectual property be transferred to the Business. Otherwise, the task of
documenting valid title will be more difficult.
C. Transferring Valid Title
The buyer should ensure that the intellectual property rights of the
Business are properly transferred and obtain representations and warran-
ties concerning the nature and extent of those rights.
Several considerations are unique to intellectual property assign-
ments and should, therefore, be taken into account to ensure that a valid
assignment of those intellectual property rights will be acceptable for
recording at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. Copyright
Office, and their foreign counterparts. These considerations include a
recitation that the goodwill associated with trademarks and service
marks is transferred with the marks and that the intellectual property is
identified by the corresponding registration, patent, or application serial
number. Finally, if it is desirable to avoid public disclosure of the acqui-
sition agreement, a separate assignment document should be prepared
for recording in government offices to cover only the intellectual prop-
erty facet of the transaction.
D. Updating Record Title
Recording transfers of intellectual property is important to provide
protection against subsequent purchasers of the intellectual property
from the Business and to evidence ownership of the intellectual property
if an infringement action becomes necessary. Depending on the nature
of the intellectual property, the type of document required and the loca-
tion in which it should be recorded will vary. For example, assignments
of U.S. patents should be recorded at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO"), while trademark security interest documents should be
recorded at both the PTO and state Uniform Commercial Code filing
locations. Documents affecting title to patents, registered trademarks,
trademark applications, or registered copyrights should be recorded
promptly to ensure validity of the transfer against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser. Transfers of patents, registered trademarks, and trademark
applications will be valid against a subsequent bona fide purchaser only
if they are recorded at the PTO within three months of the date of execu-
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tion or prior to the subsequent purchase. For a document affecting title
to a registered copyright to be valid against a subsequent bona fide pur-
chaser, it ordinarily must be recorded with the U.S. Copyright Office
within one month of execution or prior to the recordation of the subse-
quent transfer.
Moreover, if foreign intellectual property rights are involved, the
buyer should anticipate what documents it will need to file with foreign
patent, trademark, and copyright offices, and have them executed at the
closing so that foreign counsel can update record title more efficiently.
